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  INTRODUCTION   
In light of concerns about mass incarceration and excessive 
search practices by police,1 underenforcement of criminal law is 
not the first problem that springs to mind for American criminal 
justice. But in fact, some of the prominent contemporary com-
plaints about U.S. criminal justice, as well as some longstanding 
ones, object to underenforcement of criminal law. Two of the 
most notable categories are failures to prosecute in cases of un-
justified police violence, especially against nonwhite victims, 
and in cases of sexual assaults. Lower-profile examples abound 
as well, as do historical examples. 
Given the nation’s history, underenforcement problems are 
often related to race. Insufficient law enforcement attention to 
crimes in minority neighborhoods, for example, has been criti-
cized as depriving African American victims and communities of 
their fair share of government protection from criminal harm.2 
In earlier eras, law enforcement inattention to, or wholesale ne-
 
 1. U.S. incarceration rates quintupled over the last forty years and are 
five to seven times higher than those in other advanced democracies. See Floyd 
v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 572–602 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (documenting 
and holding unconstitutional widespread stop-and-frisk practices by New York 
City police that disproportionately targeted non-white men); MICHELLE ALEX-
ANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLIND-
NESS 6–9 (2010); World Prison Brief Data, INST. FOR CRIM. POL’Y RES. (2016), 
http://www.prisonstudies.org/country/united-states-america (comparing na-
tional data on total prison population and incarceration rates and reporting that 
the United States has the world’s largest prison population at 2,217,947 in-
mates). 
 2. RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 29 (1997). 
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glect of, white offenders’ victimization of black victims—in lynch-
ings, attacks on civil right activists, sexual assaults, and other 
contexts—was often patent.3 But the problem of unjustified un-
derenforcement is not confined to these contexts, nor to the 
United States. Failures to prosecute arise from a fundamental 
structural challenge faced by all criminal justice systems: how to 
ensure unbiased, evenhanded enforcement practices—safe-
guards in favor of justified enforcement. This challenge gets less 
attention than criminal procedure’s central preoccupation of 
guarding against excessive or groundless criminal charges. Con-
cern about misuse of the state’s prosecution authority rightly 
motivates much in criminal procedure, from search and seizure 
rules4 and judicial review of arrests5 to evidence disclosure du-
ties,6 the right to counsel,7 and standards of proof.8 Structural 
responses to the state declining to use its enforcement authority 
are much fewer and less prominent. At least in common law 
countries, enforcement decisions are the province of police and 
prosecutor discretion, and oversight of officials’ failures to en-
force has been left almost wholly to the political process. Deci-
sions to search, arrest, or charge face modest judicial scrutiny on 
evidentiary grounds and—at the extreme margins—racial or 
 
 3. See, e.g., EQUAL JUSTICE INITIATIVE, LYNCHING IN AMERICA: CON-
FRONTING THE LEGACY OF RACIAL TERROR 39, 48 (3d ed. 2017) (documenting 
approximately 4000 lynchings in the years 1877–1950; about one percent re-
sulted in a conviction for perpetrators). 
 4. See generally WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 126–63, 
512–49 (5th ed. 2009) (discussing search and seizure rules). 
 5. Gerstein v. Pugh, 420 U.S. 103, 111–16 (1975) (holding that the Fourth 
Amendment requires a judicial determination of probable cause prior to ex-
tended detention); County of Riverside v. McLaughlin, 500 U.S. 44, 52–58 (1991) 
(defining “prompt” under Gerstein’s requirement of a prompt judicial determi-
nation of probable cause). 
 6. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 86 (1963) (holding prosecution’s with-
holding of the confession of defendant’s confederate violated defendant’s due 
process rights). 
 7. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 342 (1963) (extending Sixth 
Amendment right to assistance of counsel to indigent state criminal defend-
ants); Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 53 (1932) (holding defendants’ rights to 
counsel of their choice throughout the prosecution process had been violated). 
 8. In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970) (holding that proof beyond a 
reasonable doubt is constitutionally required under the Due Process Clause). 
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ethnic bias.9 Decisions not to arrest or charge are virtually im-
mune from judicial review or other nonpolitical oversight.10 Like 
other common law jurisdictions, U.S. justice systems have al-
ways rejected an approach long adopted in some civil law juris-
dictions to prevent unjustified and disparate nonenforcement—
a rule of mandatory prosecution that restricts executive officials’ 
discretion over arrest and charging decisions.11 
A broader view, however, reveals that all criminal justice 
systems incorporate one or more strategies to address underen-
forcement, which can be collectively described as redundant 
charging authority. All are to some degree familiar, though they 
are not usually described in these terms or understood as serving 
this common purpose. 
One approach is creation of two distinct enforcement agen-
cies with overlapping or duplicative jurisdiction. This model is a 
familiar safeguard against underenforcement of transnational 
crimes or crimes on the high seas; international criminal law 
routinely grants nation-states coextensive, duplicative jurisdic-
tion to enforce international or domestic criminal laws outside 
their borders. International treaties on subjects such as public 
corruption, drug trafficking, and human trafficking12 can be un-
derstood as agreements to create enforcement redundancy 
among national criminal justice agencies to solve underenforce-
ment problems by particular states.13 The same arrangement oc-
curs domestically for enforcement of civil or regulatory law when 
administrative agencies have overlapping, and thus redundant, 
 
 9. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 456–71 (1996) (examining 
selective prosecution claim based on racial bias); see also Whren v. United 
States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (holding that, in assessing the legality of police 
decisions to stop suspects under the Fourth Amendment, courts should ignore 
officers’ subjective motivations). 
 10. See, e.g., Abby L. Dennis, Reining in the Minister of Justice: Prosecuto-
rial Oversight and the Superseder Power, 57 DUKE L.J. 131, 132–33 (2007) (de-
scribing prosecutors’ “limitless, unmonitored and . . . unreviewable power”). 
 11. See infra Part II.B. 
 12. See Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, 
Especially Women and Children, G.A. Res. 55/25, annex II (Nov. 15, 2000), 
https://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/organized-crime/intro/UNTOC.html; UNITED 
NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS & CRIME, WORLD DRUG REPORT 2017, U.N. SALES 
No. E.17.XI.7 (2017), https://www.unodc.org/wdr2017/index.html; U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS REPORT 438 (2017), https://www.state.gov/ 
documents/organization/271339.pdf. 
 13. See NEIL BOISTER, AN INTRODUCTION TO TRANSNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
LAW 135–95 (2d ed. 2012), http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law/ 
9780199605385.001.0001/law-9780199605385-chapter-12. 
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jurisdiction over the same regulated activities.14 The most im-
portant version of this model in the United States, however, is 
criminal justice federalism. Due to the steady growth of federal 
criminal law, jurisdiction, and institutional capacity over the 
last century, state and federal law enforcement substantially 
overlap for many categories of crime. Much of this enforcement 
redundancy, as considered in detail below, has been a deliberate 
federal response to diverse problems of underenforcement in 
state criminal justice. The point for now, however, is the func-
tional equivalence of duplicative federal-state jurisdiction, na-
tion-state jurisdiction, and agency jurisdiction. All represent a 
common strategy to reduce underenforcement by empowering 
redundant enforcement authorities: independent entities with 
equivalent institutional capacity and expertise share jurisdic-
tion. If one neglects to enforce, the other may. Functionally, each 
backstops, or provides oversight of, failures to enforce by the 
other. 
A second model for minimizing unjustified failures to prose-
cute relies on private actors to create redundancy with public 
prosecutors’ authority. Empowering private actors to file and lit-
igate public law claims is familiar in many civil law contexts; 
numerous federal statutes authorize private rights of action that 
enable private individuals or groups to supplement public agen-
cies’ law enforcement efforts.15 Through much of the nineteenth 
century, this kind of duplicative public-private enforcement au-
thority was a familiar feature in the criminal justice systems of 
many states, which permitted private parties—victims—to pros-
ecute alleged criminal wrongdoing. 
Redundant charging authority takes other forms as well. In 
large hierarchical agencies such as the U.S. Department of Jus-
tice, internal administrative review of front-line prosecutors’ 
charging or declination decisions by higher-ups creates a version 
of redundant enforcement authority; supervisors can make inde-
pendent determinations and reverse front-line prosecutors.16 
 
 14. See Jacob E. Gersen, Overlapping and Underlapping Jurisdiction in 
Administrative Law, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 201, 201–03 (2007). 
 15. Examples of federal statutes authorizing private rights of action in-
clude the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2006) (granting a private right of action 
for antitrust violations); Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2680(h) (1994); 
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f )  (1994); Americans 
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (1994). For an overview, see Pamela H. 
Bucy, Private Justice, 76 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 12–54 (2002). 
 16. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(f )  (2012) (mandating review of federal prosecutor 
decisions within the Justice Department upon victim’s request). 
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This kind of redundancy through administrative review now ex-
ists in English, Irish, and many European criminal justice sys-
tems.17 
More ambitiously from a U.S. perspective—because it is rare 
here—judicial power to review prosecutorial charging decisions 
is another means to create some degree of redundant charging 
authority between the executive and judicial branches. Although 
criminal charging is a core function of the executive branch, 
state and federal courts have modest authority to review and bar 
executive officials’ decisions to file criminal charges. It is only as 
a matter of policy that courts—with a few exceptions—are not 
empowered to address underenforcement by reviewing the exec-
utive’s noncharging decisions. (This power is somewhat broader 
for courts in England and Wales as well as in the law of a few 
states.)18 This model of redundancy separates charging author-
ity—for courts as for Department of Justice supervisors, the 
power to order prosecutors to prosecute—from enforcement au-
thority, which includes the institutional capacity to file and liti-
gate charges. Courts (with rare exceptions) have no administra-
tive capacity to litigate a prosecution; but they could provide 
some redundancy in charging authority.19 
In sum, charging redundancy can occur between equivalent 
agencies in separate governments, between public and private 
actors, or between agencies or branches of the same government. 
Criminal justice systems in Europe and the common law world 
have adopted or strengthened one or more of these mechanisms 
in recent decades. In the United States, choices among these 
strategies have changed over time and between jurisdictions. 
Nearly all states that once authorized private prosecution have 
long since prohibited it. Federal prosecutors are organized in a 
centralized hierarchical agency that makes administrative re-
view possible, but few state prosecutors are similarly organized. 
For these reasons and others, the primary means of enforcement 
redundancy to combat underenforcement is overlapping federal-
 
 17. See infra Part II.A.1. 
 18. See infra Parts II.B.3–B.4. 
 19. Note that this conception of redundant authority intersects with, but is 
distinct from, constitutional separation of powers. In a standard account (briefly 
put), separation of powers describes branches of government having distinct 
roles, authority, and competencies. In the main, branches do not do the same 
things; they do different, rival, and complementary things. But if so empowered 
by the legislature, courts can exercise some degree of charging authority, creat-
ing limited redundancy in charging authority between the executive and judi-
cial branches. 
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state authority made possible by the distinctive U.S. model of 
federalism. 
This Article has several aims. One is to introduce the con-
cept of enforcement redundancy and demonstrate its utility. An-
other is to highlight problems of criminal law underenforcement 
and to situate contemporary complaints about failures to prose-
cute police violence and sexual assaults as specific examples of 
broader enforcement deficiencies that stem from bias and favor-
itism in police and prosecutorial discretion. The Article also de-
fends the observation that enforcement redundancy strategies 
are responses to versions of this problem. It then assesses the 
strengths and weaknesses of different such strategies, with pri-
mary attention on the effectiveness of the U.S. approach of re-
dundant federal-state authority. A focus on three different cate-
gories of criminal law underenforcement—government 
corruption, police violence, and sexual assaults—clarifies differ-
ences in the effectiveness of the U.S. approach. Federalism has 
proven an effective response to states’ failures to address forms 
of public corruption, and for those crimes, it is likely superior to 
its alternatives. Federal authority has had some success in com-
pensating for states’ failures to prosecute police violence and 
other police wrongdoing, but its efficacy is harder to judge and 
arguments for supplemental redundancy strategies are stronger. 
For sexual assaults, federal authority has failed to assert any 
meaningful enforcement jurisdiction to compensate for weak-
nesses in state justice systems. Despite the sustained efforts and 
notable successes of reform advocates in this area, no model of 
enforcement redundancy has made inroads. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part II briefly surveys evi-
dence of and reasons for underenforcement. The need for safe-
guards against unjustified nonenforcement has long been recog-
nized in the United States and elsewhere; outside the United 
States, as part of victims’ rights reforms, it has been the object 
of institutional reforms. Part III elaborates the mechanisms 
available to address risks of criminal law underenforcement. The 
predominant options are (1) some authority for private actors to 
initiate or participate in criminal prosecutions; (2) judicial or ad-
ministrative review of initial nonprosecution decisions by public 
prosecutors; and (3) authority for a separate, independent public 
prosecutor’s office to bring charges when another prosecutor has 
declined to. Other countries—out of tradition, an absence of fed-
eralism, or as part of victims’ rights reforms—rely on versions of 
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the first and second options. Part III also considers why U.S. vic-
tims’ rights laws, which are otherwise robust, lack either of these 
components adopted elsewhere, especially given that many state 
criminal justice systems relied on private prosecution for much 
of the nineteenth century. The likely answers help explain why 
the United States relies almost exclusively on the third option as 
a safeguard against underenforcement. 
Finally, Part IV assesses how effectively federalism-based 
enforcement redundancy addresses underenforcement, particu-
larly the recurrent, contemporary controversies around police vi-
olence and sexual assault. Redundant enforcement through 
overlapping federalism has had considerable success addressing 
some underenforcement problems, such as corruption by state 
and local officials, certain kinds of civil rights violations, or 
crimes against disfavored minority groups.20 It is doubtful that 
private prosecution or judicial review could match its success. 
The federalism strategy has a more mixed record on the problem 
of unjustified police violence. Federal officials have succeeded 
where state officials have failed in overseeing reform of local po-
lice departments to reduce police lawbreaking, and they occa-
sionally prosecute and convict individual officers.21 But the vast 
majority of incidents of police violence go unprosecuted, includ-
ing most that lead to large civil settlements for victims.22 It is 
 
 20. See, e.g., DAVID GRANN, KILLERS OF THE FLOWER MOON: THE OSAGE 
MURDERS AND THE BIRTH OF THE FBI 57 (2017) (describing “corrupt sheriffs and 
police departments” that failed to enforce the law and were unable to solve se-
rial murders of Native American victims); Margaret Burnham, The Long Civil 
Rights Act and Criminal Justice, 95 B.U. L. REV. 687, 687–88 (2015) (discussing 
federalism-based redundancy in the context of the Civil Rights Acts); Gregory 
L. Padgett, Racially-Motivated Violence and Intimidation: Inadequate State En-
forcement and Federal Civil Rights Remedies, 75 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
103, 105 (1984) (advocating for federalism-based enforcement redundancy to 
ensure punishment in crimes against racial minorities). 
 21. On federal reform of local police, see Rachel A. Harmon, Limited Lever-
age: Federal Remedies and Policing Reform, 32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 33, 
53–56 (2012); Rachel A. Harmon, Promoting Civil Rights Through Proactive Po-
licing Reform, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1, 20–51 (2009) [hereinafter Harmon, Policing 
Reform]. 
 22. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, SHIELDED FROM JUSTICE: POLICE BRUTALITY 
AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN THE UNITED STATES 77–84, nn.149–72 (1998), https:// 
www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/reports98/police/index.htm (documenting “civil 
remedies”); id. at 89–96, nn.182–200, 92–93 tbls.1–2 (documenting “low rate of 
federal prosecutions”); Joanna C. Schwartz, How Governments Pay: Lawsuits, 
Budgets, and Police Reform, 63 UCLA L. REV. 1144, 1147–71 (2016) (document-
ing civil settlements for police wrongdoing in 100 localities); Ian Simpson, Pros-
ecution of U.S. Police for Killings Surges to Highest in Decade, REU-
TERS (Oct. 26, 2015), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-police 
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unclear what portion of those incidents merit criminal prosecu-
tion. Key facts are often disputed, and while federal and state 
jurisdiction are coextensive here, federal criminal law generally 
sets a higher bar for liability than state law, especially due to its 
more onerous mens rea requirement.23 That makes the former 
an imperfect backstop to the latter, because they are only par-
tially redundant. And as recent changes in federal policy sug-
gest,24 redundancy between governments is subject to political 
shifts in those governments; federal oversight of state enforce-
ment works only if federal officials are committed to the over-
sight role. Moreover, keeping prosecution in the exclusive prov-
ince of executive officials keeps prosecutorial discretion more 
closely aligned with political majorities and thereby with popu-
lar sentiments about certain groups of defendants (such as police 
officers) and victim groups (such as criminal suspects). In this 
context, redundancy in state law charging by courts or private 
actors, rather than rival prosecutors, might make a real contri-
bution. Finally, cases of sexual assault reveal a weakness of fed-
eralism-based redundancy. State and federal criminal jurisdic-
tion in the United States overlap more than elsewhere, but they 
are not wholly coextensive. Federal prosecutors lack authority 
over most assaults that do not involve public officials or federal 
 
-idUSKCN0SK17L20151026 (noting twelve officers were charged for fatal 
shootings in the first nine months of 2015, compared to about five per year be-
tween 2005 and 2014). 
 23. Police violence is often prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 242 (2012) (crimi-
nalizing the deprivation of rights under color of law). On challenges to prosecut-
ing police violence, including federal law’s intent requirement, see Barbara E. 
Armacost, Organizational Culture and Police Misconduct, 72 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. 453, 465–67 (2004); Mary M. Cheh, Are Lawsuits an Answer to Police Bru-
tality?, in POLICE VIOLENCE 247, 253, 258–66 (William A. Geller & Hans Toch 
eds., 1996); John V. Jacobi, Prosecuting Police Misconduct, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 
789, 806–11 (2000); Paul J. Watford, Screws v. United States and the Birth of 
Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 98 MARQ. L. REV. 465, 477–86 (2014); Mark 
Joseph Stern, Why the Feds Can’t Charge Darren Wilson: They Should, but the 
Supreme Court Gutted the Civil Rights Law He Violated when He Killed Michael 
Brown, SLATE (Mar. 4, 2015), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/ 
jurisprudence/2014/11/will_justice_department_charge_darren_wilson_ 
supreme_court_gutted_civil.html; William Yeomans, The Cognitive Dissonance 
of Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions and Race, ACS BLOG (Feb. 13, 2015), 
https://www.acslaw.org/acsblog/the-cognitive-dissonance-of-federal-civil-rights 
-prosecutions-and-race. 
 24. See, e.g., U.S. ATTORNEY GEN., MEMORANDUM: SUPPORTING FEDERAL, 
STATE, LOCAL AND TRIBAL LAW ENFORCEMENT (2017); Sari Horwitz et al., Ses-
sions Orders Justice Department to Review All Police Reform Agreements, 
WASH. POST (Apr. 3, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national 
-security/sessions-orders-justice-department-to-review-all-police-reform 
-agreements/2017/04/03/ba934058-18bd-11e7-9887-1a5314b56a08_story.html. 
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property. Sexual assaults are one context in which the enforce-
ment strategies favored in Europe and England—regulated pri-
vate prosecution or review of declination decisions—hold more 
promise. 
I.  UNDERENFORCEMENT AND REASONS NOT TO 
PROSECUTE   
A. SOURCES OF UNJUSTIFIED NONCHARGING DECISIONS 
Public prosecutors are the gatekeepers of criminal law en-
forcement, and justice systems employ a variety of safeguards 
against prosecutors’ misjudgment, bias, incompetence, or lazi-
ness. Most are directed at prosecutors’ charging decisions rather 
than decisions declining to charge (i.e., declination decisions), for 
familiar reasons—charging creates real burdens and risks for 
defendants.25 Many familiar procedural components are aimed 
at preventing improper criminal charges or the harm they can 
cause. Requirements that charges are based on sufficient evi-
dence are an obvious example, but double jeopardy laws and re-
strictions on prosecutors’ conflicts of interest serve the same pur-
pose. The full range of pretrial and trial procedures designed to 
assure accurate and unbiased adjudication are intended to sort 
out improper charges and attach punishments only to proper 
ones.26 
Safeguards against nonenforcement, or unjustified deci-
sions not to prosecute, are fewer, are less explicit, and (in com-
mon law jurisdictions) are less often in the form of legal rules 
and mandates. One explanation for this is simply that the inter-
ests at stake are not as high—no individual faces prosecution 
and possible punishment. Another is that many non-prosecution 
decisions follow from determinations that there is insufficient 
evidence to support charging, and common law jurisdictions 
 
 25. See, e.g., United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 463–66 (1996) (ex-
amining the Equal Protection Clause’s prohibition on racially-motivated charg-
ing); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1985) (holding due process bars 
prosecution in retaliation for exercising fundamental rights); Kolender v. Law-
son, 461 U.S. 352, 355 (1983) (holding due process bars unduly vague offense 
definitions to reduce opportunities for selective enforcement); Papachristou v. 
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972) (same). 
 26. See Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (regarding trial by 
jury as a “safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor”). 
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have long left those assessments in the unregulated discretion of 
police and prosecutors.27 
But that is not the whole story. For one, it does not follow 
from the fact that officials must assess evidentiary sufficiency 
that their assessments should be unregulated or unsupervised. 
The tradition in civil law jurisdictions is otherwise, and available 
evidence often depends on the effort and priority officials give to 
finding it. More importantly, how rigorously we guard against 
unmerited nonenforcement depends on how we value the inter-
ests harmed by nonenforcement, and on how much we worry 
about nonenforcement for the wrong reasons. Both have changed 
over time. 
The primary causes of underenforcement are failing to in-
vestigate and charge due to biases against certain victims or 
harms, or favoritism toward certain kinds of suspects.28 Three 
kinds of crimes—local government corruption, sexual assaults, 
and unjustified uses of force by law enforcement officers—illus-
trate the link between these risks, failures to enforce, and the 
consequences of underenforcement. Local corruption garners the 
least public and political attention now;29 not coincidentally, the 
United States has found an effective model of enforcement re-
dundancy on this front.30 The justice system’s responses to sex-
ual assault and police violence, on the other hand, are subjects 
of heated political and policy debates.31 There has been notable 
progress in reducing the criminal justice system’s disregard of 
 
 27. See Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 727–28 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (“Law enforcement is not automatic . . . . What every prosecutor is practi-
cally required to do is to select the cases for prosecution and to select those in 
which the offense is the most flagrant, the public harm the greatest, and the 
proof the most certain.” (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Attorney Gen. of the U.S., 
Address to the Second Annual Conference of United States Attorneys: The Fed-
eral Prosecutor (Apr. 1, 1940))); 483 Parl Deb HC (5th ser.) (1951) col. 681 (UK) 
(“It has never been the rule . . . that suspected criminal offences must automat-
ically be the subject of prosecution.”). 
 28. See Alexandra Natapoff, Underenforcement, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1715, 
1722–39 (2006) (documenting underenforcement as a significant problem). On 
underenforcement of sexual assault offenses, see Deborah Tuerkheimer, Un-
derenforcement as Unequal Protection, 57 B.C. L. REV. 1287, 1292–1303 (2016) 
(discussing empirical evidence of bias leading to underenforcement). 
 29. Concern about public corruption at the federal government level, by 
contrast, has increased, precisely where criminal and regulatory level are some-
what weaker. See, e.g., ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN AMERICA: FROM 
BENJAMIN FRANKLIN’S SNUFF BOX TO CITIZENS UNITED 1–16 (2014). 
 30. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 31. See, e.g., Do Police Use Deadly Force Too Often?, N.Y. TIMES: ROOM FOR 
DEBATE (Apr. 9, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2015/04/09/are 
-police-too-quick-to-use-force. 
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both kinds of offenses, but underenforcement—and almost as im-
portant, widespread suspicion of underenforcement—remain 
significant enough that they illustrate some of the key costs of 
those failures. Suspicion of underenforcement is itself a cost, be-
cause it reflects a loss of legitimacy for criminal justice institu-
tions. That loss in turn undermines the system’s efficacy if citi-
zens decline to report victimization or otherwise decline to 
cooperate with law enforcement officials. Evidence for those ef-
fects is strong for both sexual assaults and police violence.32 
More generally, underenforcement is a form of unequal treat-
ment that unevenly—and unjustly—distributes the important 
public benefits of criminal law enforcement, including the state’s 
commitment to protect everyone equally from unlawful harms.33 
It also deprives victims of the private benefits that criminal jus-
tice is now widely recognized to afford, and owe, to victims. 
1. Underenforcement Against Corruption 
Crimes of corruption by state and local officials are a good 
example of harms that, at times, criminal justice systems have 
unduly ignored.34 Local police and prosecutors are not institu-
tionally well-situated to pursue and evaluate those crimes. They 
often have professional, if not personal, ties to other local offi-
cials, which heightens the risk of undue favoritism or judgments 
that are otherwise not fully disinterested. That is the main rea-
 
 32. See MICHAEL PLANTY ET AL., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FEMALE VICTIMS 
OF SEXUAL VIOLENCE, 1994–2010, at 6 (2013), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/ 
pdf/fvsv9410.pdf (estimating portion of sexual assaults reported to police annu-
ally varied from fifty-nine to thirty-two percent between 2003–10); Nancy 
Krieger et al., Police Killings and Police Deaths Are Public Health Data and Can 
Be Counted, PLOS MEDICINE 1–4 (2015), https://journals.plos.org/plosmedicine/ 
article/file?id=10.1371/journal.pmed.1001915&type=printable (describing un-
derreporting of killings by police); Kate B. Wolitzky-Taylor et al., Is Reporting 
of Rape on the Rise? A Comparison of Women with Reported Versus Unreported 
Rape Experiences in the National Women’s Study Replication, 26 J. INTERPER-
SONAL VIOLENCE 807, 807–08 (2011) (estimating fifteen percent of rapes were 
reported to police in 2006). 
 33. This point is better developed in literature on policing than prosecution. 
See, e.g., ANGELA J. DAVIS, ARBITRARY JUSTICE: THE POWER OF THE AMERICAN 
PROSECUTOR 166 (2007) (noting that prosecutorial discretion can unintention-
ally “produce inequitable results for similarly situated victims and defend-
ants”); Natapoff, supra note 28, at 1753; David Alan Sklansky, Police and De-
mocracy, 103 MICH. L. REV. 1699, 1822 (2005) (arguing that policing failures in 
some communities undercuts “the egalitarian project of protecting all citizens 
from private violence”). 
 34. The point extends to private actors, especially organized crime, with 
ties to local officials. 
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son that federal investigators and prosecutors have state and lo-
cal corruption in their portfolios.35 
2. Underenforcement Against Sexual Assault 
Sexual assault offenses are another context in which un-
derenforcement is now widely recognized, but the causes are dif-
ferent. Rather than favoritism toward offenders, the problem 
seems to be bias against the type of offense, and, in varying de-
grees, against the victims. Failures of police to rigorously pursue 
allegations of sexual assaults have been widely documented.36 
Among the explanations that advocates, attorneys and some 
scholars point to are “the entrenched nature of long-recognized, 
gender-driven biases by police against domestic violence or sex-
ual assault claims” and “against individuals from particular 
groups or under particular circumstances,” especially against 
victims who are poor or are racial, ethnic or gender minorities.37 
One large-scale empirical study of why rape-kit evidence re-
mained untested, for example, suggested that the explanation in 
part was “negative beliefs and stereotypes about victims, which 
adversely affected the quality of the investigation.”38 It bears 
noting that much of this bias is understood to be subtle or un-
conscious patterns built on cultural norms, rather than con-
scious, purposeful disfavor.39 But when evidentiary records are 
incomplete or ambiguous, their effects are substantial. 
 
 35. See infra Part III.B.1. On local corruption, see generally, for example, 
CORRUPTION AND AMERICAN CITIES: ESSAYS AND CASE STUDIES IN ETHICAL AC-
COUNTABILITY (Joaquin Jay Gonzalez III & Roger L. Kemp eds., 2016) (discuss-
ing the role of corruption in American cities); JAMES L. MERRINER, GRAFTERS 
AND GOO GOOS: CORRUPTION AND REFORM IN CHICAGO, 1833–2003 (2004) (dis-
cussing the role of corruption in Chicago). 
 36. See Tuerkheimer, supra note 28, at 1292–99. 
 37. ACLU, RESPONSES FROM THE FIELD: SEXUAL ASSAULT, DOMESTIC VIO-
LENCE, AND POLICING 40 (2015); see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 28, at 1292–
99 (citing a range of studies to conclude that “[i]n many jurisdictions, the wide-
spread perception that law enforcement officers will likely not pursue allega-
tions of rape [due to race, class or gender bias] is entirely accurate”). 
 38. REBECCA CAMPBELL ET AL., THE DETROIT SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT (SAK) 
ACTION RESEARCH PROJECT (ARP), FINAL REPORT 109 (2015). 
 39. DAVIS, supra note 33, at 23–34; Tuerkheimer, supra note 28 (discussing 
bias in sexual assault prosecutions); cf. ACLU, supra note 37 (surveying advo-
cates, service providers, and attorneys, who described “the entrenched nature 
of long-recognized, gender-driven biases by police against domestic violence or 
sexual assault claims” and “against individuals from particular groups or under 
particular circumstances,” including “bias against survivors of color, and 
against survivors who are poor, Native American, immigrant, or LGBTQ”); 
Joshua Correll et al., The Police Officer’s Dilemma: A Decade of Research on 
Racial Bias in the Decision to Shoot, 8 SOC. & PERSONALITY PSYCHOL. COMPASS 
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3. Underenforcement Against Police Excessive Uses of Force 
Failures to prosecute in the wake of police shootings and 
other possibly excessive uses of force against civilians are sce-
narios that raise suspicions of both bias against victims, many of 
whom are black men (and often criminal suspects, another dis-
favored group), and favoritism toward the class of perpetrators, 
law enforcement officers.40 In the ordinary organization of crim-
inal justice systems, those cases call on officials from one law 
enforcement agency to assess the evidence against officials from 
another, even when the agencies regularly work together.41 As 
in the context of local public corruption, conflict-of-interest 
rules42 are far from adequate to prevent prosecutors from mak-
ing judgments in light of such professional relationships and cir-
cumstances.43 The possibility of partiality is inevitable. When 
 
201, 202–09 (2014) (finding that police training reduces some forms of racial 
bias compared to lay people in shooting simulations but cautioning training ef-
fects may be reduced by real-world stress and fatigue conditions); Jeffery J. 
Pokorak, Probing the Capital Prosecutor’s Perspective: Race of the Discretionary 
Actors, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 1811, 1817 (1998) (discussing unconscious bias in 
death penalty prosecutions). 
 40. Prison guard assaults on inmates raise the same concerns, although 
they get less public attention. For a notorious failure to prosecute prison guards 
and law enforcement officials for unjustified lethal force, see generally 
HEATHER ANN THOMPSON, BLOOD IN THE WATER: THE ATTICA PRISON UPRISING 
OF 1971 AND ITS LEGACY (2016). 
 41. Cf. Paul Cassell, Who Prosecutes the Police? Perceptions of Bias in Police 
Misconduct Investigations and a Possible Remedy, WASH. POST: VOLOLKH CON-
SPIRACY BLOG (Dec. 5, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh 
-conspiracy/wp/2014/12/05/who-prosecutes-the-police-perceptions-of-bias-in-po-
lice-misconduct-investigations-and-a-possible-remedy (describing the problem 
of local prosecutors’ handling police cases as a “perception of bias” rather than 
a “conflict of interest” and recommending state attorneys general handle police 
cases). One solution, followed in Wisconsin, is to assign investigation of deaths 
involving law enforcement officers to a state-level investigative agency uncon-
nected to the local agency of the officer under investigation. WIS. STAT. 
§§ 175.47, 950.04(1v)(do), 950.08(2g)(h) (2014). 
 42. E.g., CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS 3-1.3 (A.B.A. 2015); cf. Braman v. 
Corbett, 19 A.3d 1151, 1154 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2011) (describing a situation where 
a district attorney’s office recused itself from decision to prosecute on a private 
complaint alleging the district attorney committed rape, and the state attorney 
general investigated and made the decision not to prosecute). 
 43. For a disturbing account of prosecutorial deference to police, see NICOLE 
GONZALEZ VAN CLEVE, CROOK COUNTY: RACISM AND INJUSTICE IN AMERICA’S 
LARGEST CRIMINAL COURT 127–56 (2016); David A. Harris, The Interaction and 
Relationship Between Prosecutors and Police Officers in the United States, and 
How This Affects Police Reform Efforts, in THE PROSECUTOR IN TRANSNATIONAL 
PERSPECTIVE 54, 55, 60–63 (Erik Luna & Marianne Wade eds., 2012) (describing 
reasons why the prospect of police reform through the efforts of state prosecu-
tors is “bleak”); Nicole Gonzalez Van Cleve, Chicago’s Racist Cops and Racist 
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that possibility combines with the long history of racial dispari-
ties in U.S. criminal justice administration, widespread suspi-
cion of non-prosecution decisions in cases of police violence 
against minority civilians is hardly surprising, as the Black 
Lives Matter movement demonstrates.44 
4. Other Underenforcement Contexts 
Corruption, sexual assaults, and police violence illustrate 
the key causes and effects of failures to enforce criminal law, but 
the same forces are recognizably at work in other social contexts. 
Scholars and advocates have pointed to biases as explanations 
for inadequate law enforcement responses to offenses against 
undocumented aliens, sex workers, institutionalized persons, 
and targets of anti-LGBT hate crimes.45 Complaints that police 
ignored wrongdoing against racial-minority victims in minority 
communities were prominent in the 1970s and 1980s.46 Some of 
 
Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/15/ 
opinion/chicagos-racist-cops-and-racist-courts.html; see also Kate Levine, The 
Ultimate Conflict, SLATE (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.slate.com/articles/news_ 
and_politics/jurisprudence/2014/09/local_prosecutor_bob_mcculloch_should_ 
not_be_the_one_to_decide_whether_to.html. For a harrowing account of a fed-
eral prosecutor who did not show deference to fellow law enforcement officials 
and faced apparent retaliation for it, see PAUL BUTLER, LET’S GET FREE: A HIP-
HOP THEORY OF JUSTICE 1–21 (2009). 
 44. See, e.g., Paul D. Butler, Poor People Lose: Gideon and the Critique of 
Rights, 122 YALE L.J. 2176, 2204 (2013) (describing protest movements and 
other responses to racially disparate criminal justice policies); Roseanna Som-
mers, Will Putting Cameras on Police Reduce Polarization?, 125 YALE L.J. 1304, 
1307–17 (2016) (describing polarized public perceptions of, and protests against, 
police uses of force and non-prosecution of police); What We Believe, BLACK 
LIVES MATTER, https://blacklivesmatter.com/about/what-we-believe (last vis-
ited Oct. 30, 2018). 
 45. See Avlana Eisenberg, Expressive Enforcement, 61 UCLA L. REV. 858, 
861–64 (2014) (studying the reasons prosecutors choose not to charge hate 
crimes); Natapoff, supra note 28 (summarizing evidence of underenforcement of 
crimes against prostitutes, undocumented immigrants, residents of certain low-
income neighborhoods, and drug-crime suspects); see also HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 22, at 102 (“In fiscal year 1997, the [DOJ] Civil Rights Divi-
sion received a total of 10,891 complaints [against law enforcement offic-
ers], . . . leading to twenty-five indictments and informations, involving sixty-
seven law enforcement agents; nine were convicted, nineteen entered guilty 
pleas, and four were acquitted.”); Ryan Gabrielson et al., Deadly Force, in Black 
and White, PROPUBLICA (Oct. 10, 2014), https://www.propublica.org/article/ 
deadly-force-in-black-and-white (“[A]nalysis of killings by police shows outsize 
risk for young black males.”). 
 46. See KENNEDY, supra note 2, at 29–75 (providing a broader account of 
complaints about law enforcement providing insufficient protection to black 
communities); Rod K. Brunson & Ronald Weitzer, Police Relations with Black 
and White Youths in Different Urban Neighborhoods, 44 URB. AFF. REV. 858, 
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the remedies, however—which included harsher drug laws 
adopted with substantial support from African American politi-
cians and communities—have proven deeply problematic for 
those same communities.47 
Finally, less pernicious biases and favoritism are suspected 
explanations for lenient enforcement patterns in lower-visibility 
contexts, such as bicyclists killed by motor vehicle drivers,48 em-
ployees injured on the job due to workplace safety violations, and 
bystanders shot by recreational hunters.49 Even critics of those 
enforcement decisions in those settings view them as products of 
subtle or unconscious empathy with vehicle drivers, employers, 
and recreational gun users, which incline officials to assess con-
duct as non-negligent rather than reckless.50 Yet even those rel-
atively benign affinities can lead to sub-optimal enforcement pol-
icies that might benefit from redundant evaluation of charging 
decisions. 
B. OTHER CONTRIBUTIONS TO UNDERENFORCEMENT 
It is worth noting that prosecutors themselves might not 
share those biases so much as take account of them in a local 
community and jury pool. Expecting juries will be unreceptive to 
a case is one reason that some prosecutors cite for not charging 
in some cases. There is evidence for this with regard to hate 
 
876 (2009) (“Perceived police under-protection or poor service in poor, minority 
neighborhoods has been complained about for generations . . . .”). 
 47. MICHAEL JAVEN FORTNER, BLACK SILENT MAJORITY: THE ROCKEFEL-
LER DRUG LAWS AND THE POLITICS OF PUNISHMENT 173–216 (2015) (describing 
support from working-class and middle-class blacks for punitive drugs laws in 
the 1970s as a means to fight growing disorder in black communities); KEN-
NEDY, supra note 2, at 351–86; David A. Sklansky, Cocaine, Race, and Equal 
Protection, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1285–90 (1995) (describing the effects of anti-
cocaine laws on black communities). Underenforcement of criminal law by 
southern states through the 1960s, when civil rights activists were the victims, 
are another example. 
 48. See Daniel Duane, Is It O.K. to Kill Cyclists?, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 9, 2013), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/10/opinion/sunday/is-it-ok-to-kill-cyclists 
.html (discussing failures to prosecute motor vehicle drivers who injure or kill 
bicyclists); see also BIKEMAPS.ORG, https://bikemaps.org (last visited Oct. 30, 
2018) (displaying a crowd-sourced map of locations of cyclist injuries and fatal-
ities). 
 49. See John F. Decker, Don’t Forget to Wear Your Hunter Orange (or Flack 
Jacket): A Critique on the Lack of Prosecution of Hunting “Accidents,” 56 S.C. L. 
REV. 135, 166–73 (2004). 
 50. See id.; Duane, supra note 48. 
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crimes against LGBT victim groups, for example,51 and the diffi-
culty prosecutors have faced in convicting police officer defend-
ants is a well-recognized hurdle in police violence cases.52 The 
same considerations can cut against prosecutions when victims 
are undocumented immigrants, sex workers, prisoners, and sus-
pects in custody.53 Redundant enforcement authority can do less 
to redress this barrier, although depending on its form, it is not 
powerless. A separate prosecuting authority might bring better 
investigation and fact development, or different jurisdictional 
rules that change the composition of jury venires.54 
Inadequate funding for criminal justice agencies can also 
play a role in aggravating areas of unjustified underenforce-
ment. Lack of public resources is an accepted (and inevitable) 
justification for declining to prosecute in some cases where evi-
dence is sufficient to prove guilt.55 But funding constraints are 
 
 51. Eisenberg, supra note 45, at 893–96 (discussing data from prosecutor 
interviews). In the contexts Eisenberg describes, prosecutors typically forgo 
hate-crime offenses in favor of other charges rather than declining to prosecute 
altogether. Though the focus here is on prosecutors, they may not be the key 
cause of underenforcement. For similar reasons, police may not investigate or 
arrest in such cases, or if they do prosecution can be undermined by lax evi-
dence-gathering. Police practices are the focus on much of the scholarship on 
underenforcement of certain offenses. Much of the literature on inadequate en-
forcement of sexual assault crimes focuses on weaknesses in the police rather 
than prosecutors. See, e.g., Tuerkheimer, supra note 28, at 1292–99 (discussing 
evidence of police bias). 
 52. See, e.g., Alan Blinder, Michael Slager, Officer in Walter Scott Shooting, 
Gets 20-Year Sentence, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/12/07/us/michael-slager-sentence-walter-scott.html (explaining that an of-
ficer pled guilty in federal court after a 2016 prosecution in state court ended 
with a hung jury). 
 53. See Natapoff, supra note 28. 
 54. See, e.g., id. 
 55. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL § 9-
27.230 cmt. 1 (1997) (recognizing limited prosecution resources); see also HU-
MAN RIGHTS WATCH, supra note 22, at 99 (listing “lack of investigative or pros-
ecutorial resources” among the most common reasons noted by the federal Civil 
Rights Division for declining to prosecute); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2013 PER-
FORMANCE BUDGET: CIVIL RIGHTS DIVISION 39 (noting that strengthening of 
civil rights enforcement efforts under the “Vulnerable People Priority” policy 
“has been reversed because full funding of these program areas was not pro-
vided”). In specific contexts as diverse as tax law and marijuana control, legis-
lators intentionally limit enforcement budgets in order to restrict enforcement 
efforts. See Daniel C. Richman, Federal Criminal Law, Congressional Delega-
tion, and Enforcement Discretion, 46 UCLA L. REV. 757, 793–99 (1999) (discuss-
ing agency budget appropriations as a mechanism of congressional control over 
some agencies, such as the IRS, more than others, such as the FBI); Rachael 
Bade, Republicans Seek to Cripple IRS: The GOP’s Moves Will Gut the Tax 
Agency, Advocates Warn, POLITICO (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.politico.com/ 
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not an affirmative good on par with other policy-based, public-
interest justifications for non-prosecution, such as judgments 
finding that civil, regulatory, or public-health remedies are pref-
erable to criminal sanctions, or concluding that third-party 
harms outweigh prosecution’s benefits.56 Resource constraints 
are a problem justice systems would like to minimize. Two of the 
three primary forms of enforcement redundancy do exactly that, 
or have in the past. Expanding federal law enforcement jurisdic-
tion over crimes already within state jurisdiction was designed 
to bring federal resources to bear on crimes where state re-
sources were insufficient.57 And private prosecution, where it 
 
story/2014/12/republicans-irs-regulations-113484 (quoting a senator’s aim to 
use “[t]he power of the purse” to “push back on the regulatory overreach” of the 
IRS and EPA); Douglas A. Berman, Mixed Outcomes for Marijuana Reform Ef-
forts in Latest Omnibus Spending Bill from Congress, SENT’G L. & POL’Y BLOG 
(Dec. 16, 2015), http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/ 
2015/week51/index.html (describing H.R. 4660, enacted as part of a spending 
bill, which prohibited spending of Justice Department funding to hinder state 
medical marijuana policies). 
 56. See, e.g., CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., THE CODE FOR CROWN PROSECU-
TORS 4 (2013), https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/ 
publications/code_2013_accessible_english.pdf (providing guidelines for Eng-
land and Wales). Familiar policies include declinations based on first-offender 
or drug-court diversion programs, the adequacy of civil penalties, a policy pref-
erence for public health responses to drug abuse, and—with regard to mariju-
ana—federal deference to state policymaking. See Memorandum from James M. 
Cole, Deputy Attorney Gen. to U.S. Attorneys, Guidance Regarding Marijuana 
Enforcement (Aug. 29, 2013), http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/resources/ 
3052013829132756857467.pdf (describing Justice Department policy not to 
prosecute marijuana dealers who comply with state law). For local examples, 
see Joseph Goldstein, Spare a Swipe? New York City Eases Rules for a Subway 
Request, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 17, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/ 
nyregion/spare-a-swipe-new-york-city-eases-rules-for-a-subway-request.html 
(describing a new policy “by the Manhattan district attorney’s office to no longer 
prosecute people arrested for minor infractions such as swipe-begging, smoking 
in the subway, or taking up two seats on a subway car”); Greg LaRose, No Ar-
rests for Pot Possession in New Orleans, Council Decides, NOLA.COM (Mar. 17, 
2016), https://www.nola.com/politics/index.ssf/2016/03/marijuana_possession_ 
city_coun.html (reporting city council vote to expand range of marijuana of-
fenses for which police do not have to arrest offenders or charge as state criminal 
misdemeanors); Max Taves & Justin Scheck, San Francisco Police Ease Drug 
Enforcement, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 1, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/articles/ 
SB10000872396390444226904577559243414878630 (describing police treating 
drug possession crimes as a low priority in part because the chief prosecutor 
“looks at drug possession as a health issue”). Seattle city voters in 2003 ap-
proved Initiative 75, which established adult personal marijuana use as “Seat-
tle’s lowest law enforcement priority.” Seattle Voters Approve Initiative Making 
Marijuana Enforcement City’s “Lowest Priority,” NORML (Sept. 18, 2003), 
http://norml.org/news/2003/09/18/seattle-voters-approve-initiative-making 
-marijuana-enforcement-city-s-lowest-priority. 
 57. See Harmon, Policing Reform, supra note 21, at 20–51. Federal funding 
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still exists, has an equivalent effect—it permits victims to con-
tribute private funds to public enforcement efforts. It is no coin-
cidence that common law jurisdictions relied on private prosecu-
tion most heavily—through the mid-nineteenth century—when 
state capacity, including criminal justice infrastructure, was 
much thinner.58 
When resource constraints remain, however, they force offi-
cials to choose which cases get priority. That creates more oppor-
tunity for biases and favoritism to play a role in determining 
which cases to charge and which to forgo. That is especially so 
with crimes in which evidence development is more costly, so of-
ficials have to decide whether to invest scarce resources in those 
that require substantial investigative efforts. Both sexual as-
sault and police violence cases often require larger-scale invest-
ments to develop evidence sufficient for prosecution. Failures to 
make those investments are common reasons for non-prosecu-
tion in both contexts.59 
II.  MECHANISMS OF PROSECUTORIAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY   
For a range of reasons and across a range of contexts, public 
prosecutors’ failures to enforce criminal law have been of suffi-
cient concern to lead contemporary justice systems to devise 
checks against unjustified underenforcement. Approaches take 
three basic forms: (1) limited authority for private parties to in-
itiate or participate in criminal prosecutions; (2) independent re-
view of initial non-prosecution decisions, upon petition from a 
 
to state and local enforcement agencies is a more direct example of supplement-
ing resources. Federal influence over local enforcement policies that comes with 
such funding is an attenuated version of enforcement redundancy. Id. at 66. 
 58. On staffing of state prosecutor offices in the nineteenth century, see 
NICHOLAS R. PARRILLO, AGAINST THE PROFIT MOTIVE: THE SALARY REVOLU-
TION IN AMERICAN GOVERNMENT, 1780–1940, at 11–23 (2013). 
 59. On sexual assault cases (especially reasons for not testing evidence 
gathered in rape kits), see CAMPBELL ET AL., supra note 38, at 60–100; Tuerk-
heimer, supra note 28, at 1297. On police use-of-force cases, see HUMAN RIGHTS 
WATCH, supra note 22, at 99 (reporting that the Justice Department Civil 
Rights Division’s “most common reasons for declining prosecution were: weak 
or insufficient admissible evidence . . . ; lack of evidence of criminal in-
tent; . . . and lack of investigative or prosecutorial resources”). For a good anal-
ysis of how police shootings of “unarmed victims” vary widely in critical factual 
details and why many are justified, see Heather Mac Donald, Black and Un-
armed: Behind the Numbers: What the Black Lives Matter Movement Misses 
About Those Police Shootings, MARSHALL PROJECT (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www 
.themarshallproject.org/2016/02/08/black-and-unarmed-behind-the-numbers. 
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victim; and (3) multiple, independent public prosecution agen-
cies with independent authority to bring charges for the same 
wrongdoing. Outside the United States, the first two options pre-
dominate; their expansion in recent years is a direct consequence 
of broader reforms to expand crime victims’ rights.60 U.S. juris-
dictions, however, rely almost wholly on the third model. Despite 
having adopted otherwise expansive victims’ rights laws in re-
cent decades in response to an influential movement for crime 
victims’ rights, state and federal laws consistently and explicitly 
avoid granting any formal authority to private parties, or courts, 
over criminal charging. The next three Sections provide an over-
view of these options, where they exist. Largely with regard to 
U.S. policy choices only, they also suggest reasons that one 
model prevailed over others. 
A. VICTIM RIGHTS AND PRIVATE VERSUS PUBLIC INTERESTS 
In the wake of victims’ rights movements in North America 
and Europe, crime victims now have an array of legal rights once 
criminal charges are filed. Victims in the U.S. and European ju-
risdictions now commonly have rights to participate that include 
rights to consult with prosecutors, to be notified of and present 
at court proceedings, and to offer statements at stages such as 
hearings on bail, sentencing, and parole.61 
Under the criminal justice systems of all other major com-
mon law countries and nearly all European states, victims’ 
rights also include authority to challenge prosecutors’ decisions 
not to prosecute, either by a limited right to initiate prosecutions 
as private parties or by enabling victims to trigger judicial or 
 
 60. See, e.g., Council Directive 2012/29, 2012 O.J. (L 315) 57 (EC), http://eur 
-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32012L0029 (defining 
standards for treatment and rights of crime victims in E.U. member states); 
Marie Manikis, Conceptualizing the Victim Within Criminal Justice Processes 
in Common Law Tradition, in OXFORD HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL PROCESS (Dar-
ryl K. Brown et al. eds., forthcoming 2019) (manuscript at 18–19) (on file with 
author). 
 61. For an overview of victim rights in Europe, see Slawomir R. Buczma, 
An Overview of the Law Concerning Protection of Victims of Crime in the View 
of the Adoption of the Directive 2012/29/EU Establishing Minimum Standards 
on the Rights, Support and Protection of Victims of Crime in the European Un-
ion, 14 ERA F. 235, 239–41 (2013). On U.S. jurisdictions, see Crime Victim 
Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) (2012) (enumerating the federal rights 
of victims of crime); Michael Solimine & Kathryn Elvey, Federalism, Federal 
Courts, and Victims’ Rights, 64 CATH. U. L. REV. 909, 913–14 & nn.30–31 (2015) 
(collecting all thirty-two state constitutional provisions and all fifty state stat-
utes relating to victims’ rights). 
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administrative review of noncharging decisions.62 By contrast, 
nearly every U.S. jurisdiction rejects these mechanisms. State 
and federal laws consistently avoid permitting victims any 
power to challenge or encroach on public prosecutorial authority. 
Federal law, for example, explicitly dictates that “[n]othing in 
this [victims’ rights] chapter shall be construed to impair the 
prosecutorial discretion of the Attorney General or any officer 
under his direction.”63 State statutes manifest the same policy in 
various ways, such as by prohibiting legal remedies for violations 
of participation rights they create.64 U.S. laws limit victims’ par-
ticipation to “non-dispositive” forms, such as providing infor-
mation and personal statements to prosecutors, judges, and pa-
role boards, which facilitates victims’ influence on public 
officials’ decisionmaking.65 But state and federal policy rejects 
enlisting victims as “agents of accountability” for public prosecu-
tion.66 
In U.S. jurisdictions and elsewhere, the conceptual innova-
tion of victims’ rights laws was to recognize victims’ distinct pri-
 
 62. See infra Part II.B. 
 63. 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(6). Elsewhere, regarding victim complaints of rights 
violations to the Justice Department, the statute provides that “the Attorney 
General . . . shall be the final arbiter of the complaint, and that there shall be 
no judicial review of the final decision of the Attorney General by a complain-
ant.” Id. § 3771(f ) (2)(D); see also United States v. Thetford, 935 F. Supp. 2d 
1280, 1282 (N.D. Ala. 2013) (“These rights, however, do not extend to giving 
crime victims veto power over the prosecutor’s discretion.”); Does v. United 
States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1343 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (“[T]o the extent that the 
victims’ pre-charge CVRA rights impinge upon prosecutorial discretion, under 
the plain language of the statute those rights must yield.”). 
 64. See, e.g., OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.06(A) (West 2004) (“A prosecu-
tor’s failure to confer with a victim . . . do[es] not affect the validity” of a decision 
to dismiss charges, plea agreement, or other disposition). Only a few jurisdic-
tions, such as California and the federal system, provide for meaningful enforce-
ment of participation rights by, for example, allowing victims to intervene in 
trial proceedings to demand rights, or to appeal trial court violations; to facili-
tate a remedy, courts may order that a guilty plea or sentence be re-opened. See 
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 28(c)(1) (stating that a victim may enforce a list of enumer-
ated rights in trial or appellate court “as a matter of right”); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d); 
cf. Paroline v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 1710, 1718 (2014) (providing an example 
of a decision resulting from a victim’s appeal of a restitution order). 
 65. See Ian Edwards, An Ambiguous Participant: The Crime Victim and 
Criminal Justice Decision-Making, 44 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 967, 974 (2004) 
(classifying “dispositive” and “non-dispositive” forms of victim participation and 
putting modes of consultation, information-provision, and expression under the 
latter heading). 
 66. See Marie Manikis, Expanding Participation: Victims as Agents of Ac-
countability in the Criminal Justice Process, PUB. L. 63, 69 n.29 (2017). 
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vate interests in public criminal litigation. Most rights are spe-
cific entitlements to advance victims’ broader, dignitary right to 
be “treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dig-
nity.”67 These provisions conceive of victims as “agents of indi-
vidual rights” and “independent from systemic interests,” and 
their interests can either conflict or align with those of law en-
forcement.68 At the same time, victim participation rights can 
also be understood to serve a broader public interest in proce-
dural outcomes, on the premise, for example, that prosecutors’ 
and judges’ decisions will improve with direct input from victims. 
Public decisionmaking risks substantive deficiency, and crimi-
nal process would be procedurally deficient, without due regard 
for victims’ interests. Jurisdictions that empower victims to chal-
lenge non-prosecution decisions enable private parties them-
selves to address the problem of criminal law underenforcement. 
The remainder of this Section provides some detail on contempo-
rary forms of private prosecution authority, their capacity to ad-
vance public as well as private interests, and reasons for its ab-
sence (or demise) in U.S. jurisdictions. 
1. Private Prosecution in the Shadow of Public Prosecution 
Public prosecutors now dominate enforcement decisions in 
both common law-based and civil law-based justice systems 
worldwide. That is hardly surprising, given the far-reaching reg-
ulatory scope of modern criminal law and high expectations that 
the state will ensure security against social disorder and innu-
merable harms, and will intervene in risk creation long before 
manifest criminal conduct or injury.69 That agenda requires ca-
pacity, resources, and expertise that only public agencies can 
marshal. Moreover, a criminal enforcement regime that relied 
heavily on private plaintiffs would be one skewed against re-
dress for poor victims who cannot bear litigation costs to vindi-
cate their own interests.70 Without safeguards, such a regime 
 
 67. See, e.g., OHIO CONST. art. I, § 10(a) (establishing victims’ rights to “fair-
ness, dignity, and respect”); TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1) (establishing victims’ 
“right to be treated with fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity and 
privacy”); 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) (establishing victims’ “right to be treated with 
fairness and with respect for the victim’s dignity”). 
 68. Manikis, supra note 60. 
 69. Among myriad examples are crimes of preparation, conspiracy, posses-
sion of contraband, consensual exchanges (e.g., of drugs or sex for money), and 
many kinds of criminal attempts. See ANDREW ASHWORTH & LUCIA ZEDNER, 
PREVENTIVE JUSTICE 95–118, 171–223 (2014). 
 70. DOUGLAS CAMPBELL, 2 THE PURITAN IN HOLLAND, ENGLAND, AND 
AMERICA 444 (1892) (criticizing the English system of private prosecution as 
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also could be at the mercy of the varied, perhaps idiosyncratic 
motives and interests of private actors lodging criminal com-
plaints. 
Still, many countries continue to authorize private citizens 
to initiate criminal prosecutions when public officials do not, and 
others allow privately funded attorneys to assist or supplement 
public prosecutors in litigating criminal cases. Canada, Aus-
tralia, New Zealand, and England and Wales all continue to al-
low private prosecutions,71 and fifteen of the twenty-eight mem-
ber states of the European Union grant victims some comparable 
 
one “by the rich for the rich”); JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A 
SEARCH FOR IDENTITY 17 (1980). German victims who challenge a non-prosecu-
tion decision must put up security to cover the public costs of judicial review. 
See STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], § 176, 
translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo 
.html; Ante Novokmet, The Right of a Victim to a Review of a Decision Not to 
Prosecute as Set out in Article 11 of Directive 2012/29/EU and an Assessment 
of Its Transposition in Germany, Italy, France and Croatia, 12 UTRECHT L. REV. 
86, 94 (2016). 
 71. For England and Wales, see Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, c. 23, § 6, 
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1985/23 (stating that the creation of 
Crown Prosecution Service shall not “preclude any person from instituting any 
criminal proceedings or conducting any criminal proceedings”). For Canada, see, 
for example, Ontario Provincial Offences Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. P.33; Director of 
Public Prosecutions Act, S.C. 2006, c 9, § 121, para. 3(3)(f )  (describing DPP “du-
ties and functions,” which includes “exercis[ing] the authority of the Attorney 
General respecting private prosecutions, including to intervene and assume the 
conduct of—or direct the stay of—such prosecutions”); Private Prosecutions, 
MINISTRY ATT’Y GEN., https://www.attorneygeneral.jus.gov.on.ca/english/ 
private_prosecution.php (last modified Oct. 29, 2015) (describing private prose-
cutions and noting “the Criminal Code and the Crown Attorneys Act authorize 
Crown Counsel to supervise privately laid charges to ensure that such prosecu-
tions are in the best interest of the administration of justice” and to “take over 
the prosecution” of indictable offences); Private Prosecutions, PUB. PROSECU-
TION SERV. CAN., http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/pub/fpsd-sfpg/fps-sfp/fpd/ch26 
.html (last modified Dec. 24, 2008). For Australia, see, for example, Director of 
Public Prosecutions Act 1983 s 10(2) (Austl.) (preserving private prosecution); 
id. s 9(5) (giving the Director power to take over a prosecution for a Common-
wealth offence that has been instituted by another and either carry on or dis-
continue it); Annual Report 2014–15, COMMONWEALTH DIR. PUB. PROSECU-
TIONS (2015), https://www.cdpp.gov.au/2014-15-annual-report-html-0 
(reporting three private prosecutions in 2014–15, two of which were discontin-
ued by the DPP); see also Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1984 (Queensl.) s 
10(c)(2) (Austl.) (giving DPP the power to “take over and conduct” criminal pro-
ceedings); Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1986 (N.S.W.) s 9 (Austl.) (using 
similar language to Commonwealth DPP Act); DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS 
VICT., ANNUAL REPORT 14–15, at 86, http://www.opp.vic.gov.au/getattachment/ 
8bc2fefc-8715-4516-9fb8-57ea3e4b6342/OPP_Annual_Report_14_15_Full_web 
.aspx (noting that pursuant to discretion granted under § 22(b)(ii), the DPP took 
over and dismissed one private prosecution instituted for an “improper pur-
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authority.72 Details vary across jurisdictions, but everywhere 
private prosecutors’ authority is limited by oversight from public 
 
pose”). Regarding New Zealand, see Criminal Disclosure Act 2008 (N.Z.); Crim-
inal Procedure Act 2011 (N.Z.); CROWN LAW, SOLICITOR-GENERAL’S PROSECU-
TION GUIDELINES 4 (2013), http://www.crownlaw.govt.nz/assets/Uploads/ 
Prosecution-Guidelines/prosecution-guidelines-2013.pdf. 
Scotland is much more restrictive. See Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 
1975, c. 21, § 310A (Scot.) (stating in a provision added in 1996 that “[e]xcept 
where any enactment otherwise expressly provides, all prosecutions under this 
Part of this Act shall be brought at the instance of the procurator fiscal”); FRA-
ZER MCCALLUM, SCOTTISH PARLIAMENT INFO. CTR., THE SCOTTISH CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE PUBLIC PROSECUTION SYSTEM 2 (2016), http://www 
.parliament.scot/ResearchBriefingsAndFactsheets/S5/SB_16-47_The_ 
Scottish_Criminal_Justice_System_The_Public_Prosecution_System.pdf 
(“Prosecutions by private individuals are possible in some circumstances, but 
are very rare.”). Before 1995, judicial approval was granted for only two private 
prosecutions in Scotland in the twentieth century. See Woman Loses Attempt to 
Bring Private Prosecution. Judges Reject Move on Rape Case, HERALD SCOT. 
(June 1, 1995), http://www.heraldscotland.com/sport/spl/aberdeen/woman-loses 
-attempt-to-bring-private-prosecution-judges-reject-move-on-rape-case-1 
.677607. 
 72. See Challenging the Decision Not to Prosecute, EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR 
FUNDAMENTAL RTS. (2014) [hereinafter FRA Report], http://fra.europa.eu/en/ 
publications-and-resources/data-and-maps/comparative-data/victims-support 
-services/prosecution (summarizing policies of EU nations). This source argua-
bly overstates private-prosecution jurisdictions by characterizing “private pros-
ecution” broadly to include states, such as France, in which victims can initiate 
petty offense charges and inquiries by investigating judges but may pursue only 
civil actions without public prosecutors. See Country Studies for the Project ‘Vic-
tim Support Services in the EU: An Overview and Assessment of Victims’ Rights 
in Practice,’ EUR. UNION AGENCY FOR FUNDAMENTAL RTS. (Feb. 2016), http:// 
fra.europa.eu/en/country-data/2016/country-studies-project-victim-support 
-services-eu-overview-and-assessment-victims. For separate developments in 
the Council of Europe, including standards for victim assistance and procedural 
rights to be informed about and participate in criminal proceedings, and for a 
victim’s right to review decisions not to prosecute, see COMM. OF MINISTERS, 
COUNCIL OF EUR., RECOMMENDATION REC(2006)8 OF THE COMMITTEE OF MIN-
ISTERS TO MEMBER STATES ON ASSISTANCE TO CRIME VICTIMS (2006); COMM. OF 
MINISTERS, COUNCIL OF EUR., RECOMMENDATION NO. R (87) 4 OF THE COMMIT-
TEE OF MINISTERS TO MEMBER STATES CONCERNING THE SIMPLIFICATION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1987); COMM. OF MINISTERS, COUNCIL OF EUR., RECOM-
MENDATION NO. R (87) 4 OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS TO MEMBER STATES 
ON THE PROTECTION OF WORKERS IN THE EVENT OF EMPLOYERS’ INSOLVENCY 
(1987); COMM. OF MINISTERS, COUNCIL OF EUR., RECOMMENDATION NO. R (85) 
11 OF THE COMMITTEE OF MINISTERS TO MEMBERS STATES ON THE POSITION OF 
THE VICTIM IN THE FRAMEWORK OF CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE (1985). For 
analysis of Directive 2012/29 as well as Council of Europe recommendations, 
see Buczma, supra note 61, at 242–48. 
In Germany, victims can initiate a private prosecution for certain minor 
offenses, and for more serious offenses may take a formal role as accessory pros-
ecutors with rights to participate in proceedings and to be heard before charges 
are dismissed. See STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [StPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE], §§ 374–94, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ 
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prosecutors and courts.73 The standard common law model is 
that public prosecutors retain the power to take over privately 
filed charges and then either try the case themselves, negotiate 
a plea bargain, or—more commonly when intervention occurs—
dismiss the charges altogether. In this framework, private actors 
can press charges when public officials do not, but functionally 
they serve primarily as a mechanism for political accountability. 
Through private charging in the wake of public prosecutors’ dec-
lination, victims force public officials to justify publicly their rea-
sons for not charging and for vetoing privately filed charges—
and to do so on grounds other than public resource constraints, 
given that a private actor has offered to bear the costs. Given the 
private cost barriers and the capacity of public prosecution agen-
cies, it is unsurprising that, even where permitted, privately in-
itiated charges nonetheless contribute to a tiny fraction of pros-
ecutions on criminal dockets.74 
2. Abolition of Private Prosecution in State Criminal Justice 
U.S. jurisdictions are comparative exceptions; nearly all 
long ago prohibited privately initiated prosecutions,75 even 
though in other contexts private actors continue to enforce public 
law in service of public interests.76 But private criminal charges 
were once common and significant in many state justice systems. 
U.S. colonies and states created public prosecution offices much 
earlier than England.77 
 
stpo/englisch_stpo.html (describing rights of privateklage); id. §§ 153, 395–402 
(describing rights of nebenkläger); see also id. §§ 403–406c (describing compen-
sation); id. § 172 (describing victim’s right to seek court order to compel public 
prosecution); MICHAEL BOHLANDER, PRINCIPLES OF GERMAN CRIMINAL PROCE-
DURE 25, 64 (2012). 
 73. This describes, for example, the German system that allows private 
parties to act as accessory prosecutors alongside public prosecutors. See 
STRAFPROZESSORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], §§ 153, 395–
402 (describing rights of nebenkläger). 
 74. See, e.g., COMMONWEALTH DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, supra note 71 
(reporting three private prosecutions in federal courts in 2014–15). 
 75. By the end of the nineteenth century, state and federal justice systems 
were firmly committed to the principle that prosecution is an exclusive power of 
public officials in which private victims have no role or standing. See Malley v. 
Lane, 115 A. 674, 676 (Conn. 1921); cf. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 
619 (1973) (“[A] citizen lacks standing to contest the policies of the prosecuting 
authority when he himself is neither prosecuted nor threatened with prosecu-
tion. . . . [I]n American jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially 
cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another.”). 
 76. See Manikis, supra note 66. 
 77. See JACOBY, supra note 70, at 5–7; Jack M. Kress, Progress and Prose-
cution, 423 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 99, 100 (1976); Allen Steinberg, 
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Even so, in the nation’s earliest decades, those officials were 
often part-time or short-term officials, whose duties were often 
primarily quasi-judicial or administrative.78 For those reasons, 
in many states those officials coexisted alongside private prose-
cutors with whom they shared some similarities. Early public 
prosecutors were paid by the case or the conviction79 and pur-
sued cases from private complainants.80 But by the mid-nine-
teenth century, every state had public prosecutor offices of some 
sort.81 Increasingly, they were full-time and accompanied by 
 
From Private Prosecution to Plea Bargaining: Criminal Prosecution, the District 
Attorney, and American Legal History, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 568, 571–72 (1984) 
(finding that private prosecutions predominated in the colonies). In 1704, Con-
necticut established what was probably the first public prosecutor’s office. See 
JACOBY, supra note 70, at 17; Kress, supra, at 103. When Blackstone described 
criminal law as predominantly directed at public wrongs, he did so in the con-
text of a late eighteenth century justice system in which private prosecutions 
were common. See 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND: BOOK THE FOURTH 5–6 (1795). 
 78. See JACOBY, supra note 70, at 23 (concluding that after 1789 “for the 
first half-century at least” the public prosecutor was “clearly a minor actor in 
the court’s structure” with a more judicial than executive role); Stephanie A.J. 
Dangel, Note, Is Prosecution a Core Executive Function? Morrison v. Olson and 
the Framers’ Intent, 99 YALE L.J. 1069, 1073 (1990) (“First, colonial attorneys 
general and district attorneys performed non-prosecutorial tasks . . . .” ); see also 
Steinberg, supra note 77, at 577 (noting public prosecutor’s duties included re-
sponsibility for the court calendar). England had no full-scale prosecution 
agency until the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service in the Prosecution 
of Offences Act 1985. See Prosecution of Offences Act 1985, c. 23. The Director 
of Public Prosecutions office was established in 1879, but it supplemented ra-
ther than displaced private prosecution. See Glanville Williams, The Power to 
Prosecute, CRIM. L. REV. 596, 601–03 (1955) (noting 1879 creation of Director of 
Public Prosecutions and describing police as de facto public prosecutors). 
 79. See PARRILLO, supra note 58. 
 80. Professional police forces did not arise until the 1850s, so victims inves-
tigated crimes and arrested offenders. See Peggy M. Tobolowsky, Victim Partic-
ipation in the Criminal Justice Process: Fifteen Years After the President’s Task 
Force on Victims of Crime, 25 NEW ENG. J. CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 21, 25 
(1999) (explaining that, to arrest offenders, victims could enlist the “aid of the 
local watchman, justice of the peace, or constable for whose assistance the vic-
tim paid”). 
 81. See, e.g., MIKE MCCONVILLE & CHESTER MIRSKY, JURY TRIALS AND 
PLEA BARGAINING: A TRUE HISTORY 25–42 (2005) (describing early systems in 
New York of judicial or gubernatorial appointment of prosecutors, until the of-
fice first became elective in 1847); ALLEN STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADELPHIA, 1800–1880, at 152–58 (1989) (stating that 
Philadelphia first elected its district attorney in 1850). Prosecutors as well as 
judges became elected positions in many states as part of a wave of state con-
stitutional reform in the mid-nineteenth century. See, e.g., IND. CONST. art. 7, 
§ 11 (1851); MD. CONST. art. 5 (1851); see also id. art. 3 (forbidding creation of 
state attorney general office); MICH. CONST. arts. 8, 10 (1850); N.Y. CONST. art. 
10 (1846); N.C. CONST. art. 4, § 29 (1868); VA. CONST. art. 6, §§ 6, 8, 30 (1851). 
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public police forces. In this context, private prosecutions dimin-
ished, then vanished.82 
However, because public prosecutors continued to suffer 
from poor funding (and consequently were held in low regard),83 
some states continued an alternate form of private prosecution: 
privately funded attorneys could assist in criminal prosecutions 
as long as the public prosecutor supervised or retained formal 
control.84 This form of ancillary or supplementary private prose-
cution, which leaves charging decisions in public hands, is still 
permitted in several states.85 Otherwise, only vestiges of private 
 
 82. See JACOBY, supra note 70, at 6 (arguing that American prosecutors 
evolved from weak to strong figures largely because they were popularly elected 
and tied to local government organization). Public and private prosecutors co-
existed for a few decades in some places. See Cantrell v. Commonwealth, 329 
S.E.2d 22, 25 (Va. 1985) (describing the history of private prosecution in Vir-
ginia); State v. Stein, 30 S.C.L. (1 Rich.) 189, 190 (S.C. 1845) (affirming that 
private individuals may file criminal or civil actions for the same offense but 
must elect the form before trial); Corley v. Williams, 17 S.C.L. (1 Bail.) 588, 588–
89 (S.C. 1830) (providing an example of private prosecution). Pennsylvania and 
New York relied heavily on private prosecutors for criminal law enforcement 
before 1850. See Stewart v. Sonneborn, 98 U.S. 187, 198 (1879) (Bradley, J., 
dissenting) (“[E]very man in the community, if he has probable cause for prose-
cuting another, has a perfect right, by law, to institute such prosecution, subject 
only, in the case of private prosecutions, to the penalty of paying the costs if he 
fails in his suit.”); MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, supra note 81 (describing New York 
courts with private prosecutors and, prior to 1847, judicial or gubernatorial ap-
pointments of public prosecutors); STEINBERG, supra note 81, at 24–69, 152–57 
(describing private prosecutions, screened by aldermen acting as magistrates, 
and creation of elected district attorney’s office in 1852). 
 83. Robert M. Ireland, Privately Funded Prosecution of Crime in the Nine-
teenth-Century United States, 39 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 43, 44–45 (1995) (recount-
ing numerous comments by state supreme courts on the low quality and inade-
quate funding of public prosecutor offices). 
 84. See Erikson v. Pawnee Cty. Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs, 263 F.3d 1151, 1154 
(10th Cir. 2001) (finding no due process violation because private attorney as-
sisting prosecution did not “control[ ]  critical prosecutorial decisions”). The first 
states to prohibit privately funded prosecutors even under supervision of public 
prosecutors were Massachusetts, Michigan, and Wisconsin. See Commonwealth 
v. Gibbs, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 146, 147–48 (1855); Meister v. People, 31 Mich. 99, 
104–06 (1875); Biemel v. State, 37 N.W. 244, 248–49 (Wis. 1888). See also Ire-
land, supra note 83, at 49 (listing fifteen states that still approved privately 
funded prosecutors in 1900). Other states abolished this practice more recently. 
See State ex rel. Wild v. Otis, 257 N.W.2d 361, 365 (Minn. 1977) (holding that 
party has no right of private prosecution); State v. Harrington, 534 S.W.2d 44, 
48 (Mo. 1976) (holding that a right of private prosecution should not be permit-
ted); People v. Calderone, 573 N.Y.S.2d 1005, 1007 (N.Y. City Crim. Ct. 1991) 
(concluding that under New York law private prosecutions by interested parties 
or their attorneys present inherent conflicts of interest which violate defend-
ants’ due process rights); State v. Best, 186 S.E.2d 1, 4 (N.C. 1972) (noting that 
a public prosecutor must be in charge of all prosecutions). 
 85. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 3:23-9 (permitting private prosecutor with approval 
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prosecution remain in a few states. Pennsylvania seems to have 
the strongest version: it permits private prosecutions for any of-
fense upon the approval from a state prosecutor or a judge.86 
Rhode Island authorizes private prosecutions only for misde-
meanors.87 Under state common law, New Hampshire might per-
mit the same for nonjailable offenses.88 Beyond that, judges in 
many states can issue an arrest warrant or criminal summons 
based on a private person’s testimony, but public prosecutors 
control whether to go forward with the case.89 
 
of the public prosecutor and court); N.J. CT. R. 7:8-7(b) (permitting private pros-
ecutor for cross-complaints with court approval); State v. Harton, 296 S.E.2d 
112, 113 (Ga. 1982) (private party not allowed to prosecute without state ap-
proval); State v. Moose, 313 S.E.2d 507, 512–13 (N.C. 1984) (stating that private 
attorneys may assist public solicitors where public solicitors retain control and 
management of prosecution); Cantrell, 329 S.E.2d at 25 (stating that private 
attorneys may assist commonwealth attorneys with the permission of the pros-
ecutor and the court); 63C AM. JUR. 2d Prosecuting Attorneys § 12 (2018) (citing 
authority in some states that private attorneys may assist public prosecutors). 
For a state statute that apparently gives the “prosecuting witness” a right to 
pay a private attorney to assist the public prosecutor without the latter’s con-
sent, see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 19-717 (2017); see also John D. Bessler, The Public 
Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511, 
529, nn.71–72 (1994) (citing cases in majority of states allowing private prose-
cutors to assist in public prosecutions). Bessler identifies three states that “al-
low private prosecutors to participate without the consent or supervision of the 
district attorney,” but in all three states, the public prosecutor initiated and 
litigated the criminal charge, while the private prosecutor assisted in the litiga-
tion as counsel to a victim. Id. at 529, n.71. 
 86. 234 PA. CODE § 506 (2001); In re Private Criminal Complaints of Raf-
ferty, 969 A.2d 578, 582 (Pa. 2009) (discussing the ability of a prosecutor to ap-
prove or disapprove of private complaints). Judges may authorize private coun-
sel to take over as prosecutor upon finding that a district attorney has 
“neglect[ed] or refuse[ed] to prosecute” a properly grounded charge. See 16 PA. 
STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 1409 (West 2016) (authorizing victims dissatis-
fied with public prosecutor to petition the court and granting courts the power 
to allow victim’s attorney to take over as private prosecutor). 
 87. See 12 R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 12-4-1, 12-4-2, 12-4-6, 12-12-1.3 (2017); Cro-
nan ex rel. State v. Cronan, 774 A.2d 866, 871 (R.I. 2001) (approving private 
misdemeanor prosecution for assault under state statutes). 
 88. See State v. Martineau, 808 A.2d 51, 54 (N.H. 2002); see also State by 
Tucker v. Gratta, 133 A.2d 482, 482 (N.H. 1957) (holding that state prosecutors 
retain power to dismiss private criminal complaints). 
 89. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 15A-303, 304 (2016); Moose, 313 S.E.2d at 
512–13 (requiring that the public prosecutor remain in continuous control of the 
case). Scattered marginal remnants of private enforcement may remain else-
where, such as an Oklahoma statute providing that prosecutions for adultery (a 
felony) may be “commenced and carried on against either of the parties to the 
crime only by his or her own husband or wife.” OKLA. STAT. tit. 21 § 871 (2017) 
(“Prosecution for adultery can be commenced and carried on against either of 
the parties to the crime only by his or her own husband or wife as the case may 
be, or by the husband or wife of the other party to the crime.”). 
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In sum, U.S. jurisdictions are unusual among common law 
jurisdictions in having abolished private prosecution as a means 
to vindicate victims’ private interests, a supplement to public en-
forcement resources, and a structural check on selective un-
derenforcement from biases in public prosecutors’ discretionary 
decisions not to charge. English authorities, in contrast, explic-
itly recognize this public function for private prosecution. Pri-
vate actors’ authority to second-guess declination decisions—
charging decision redundancy—operates as “the ultimate safe-
guard for the citizen against inaction on the part of the authori-
ties.”90 The only remnant of this view in the United States seems 
to be in Pennsylvania. Its courts view victim-initiated prosecu-
tions as fulfilling the same structural purpose. Allowing private 
actors to begin prosecutions meets “the need for a system of 
checks and balances on the office of the district attorney” and 
“constitute[s] a recognition by the legislature that the office of 
the district attorney should be subject to a system of checks and 
balances.”91 
The rarity of private charges in jurisdictions that authorize 
them hardly justifies their abolition. Private prosecutions should 
be rare in well-functioning public prosecution systems, because 
public agencies pursue most provable cases and because private 
actors must bear considerable costs to press charges themselves. 
Moreover, other rules and institutions—including other safe-
guards on prosecutorial charging—endure despite few indica-
tions of their utility. There has never been a successful claim 
that a criminal charge violated the Equal Protection prohibition 
on racially biased charging,92 but few argue the doctrine lacks at 
least normative value.93 Grand juries rarely reject prosecutors’ 
 
 90. THE ROYAL COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1981, Cmnd. 8092, 
¶ 7.47 (UK); see also Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers [1978] AC (HL) 
435 at 477 (Eng. and Wales) (private prosecutions are a “valuable constitutional 
safeguard against inertia or partiality on the part of the authority”); cf. Manikis, 
supra note 66, at 67, 71 (describing review as a means to correct prosecution 
errors). 
 91. In re Hickson, 2000 PA Super 402, ¶¶ 22, 41; see also In re Piscanio, 344 
A.2d 658, 660–61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (“The judge’s independent review of the 
complaint checks and balances the district attorney’s decision and further 
hedges against possibility of error.”). 
 92. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 461–64 (1996). 
 93. Arguments for strengthening the doctrine to make claims easier to pur-
sue are common. See, e.g., Richard H. McAdams, Race and Selective Prosecution: 
Discovering the Pitfalls of Armstrong, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 605, 606 (1998) 
(discussing use of the equal protection doctrine but challenging current prece-
dent). 
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charging requests for indictments, but courts continue to tout 
them as a structural check on prosecutors.94 Like private prose-
cution, these safeguards may work by deterring biased or ill-con-
ceived prosecutorial decisions; their efficacy is probably impossi-
ble to measure. 
A contributing explanation for the U.S. aversion to private 
prosecution may lie in a familiar theme of U.S. law and history: 
race. During the first several decades of the nineteenth century, 
when private citizens could prosecute crimes, many states—and 
not only Southern ones—either denied African Americans legal 
capacity as litigants95 or barred them from testifying under oath 
on the basis of race. Among other effects, those barriers barred 
private prosecutions by African Americans.96 After 1865—an era 
in which rights to litigate and testify were viewed by many as 
more meaningful than the right to vote97—those race-based legal 
disabilities were abolished.98 In the same period, private charg-
ing authority, already on the decline, was abolished in most 
 
 94. Grand juries remain a fixture in the federal system and in roughly half 
the states. See SARA SUN BEALE ET AL., GRAND JURY LAW AND PRACTICE § 1:5 
(2d ed. 2017) (describing grand jury status and rules in states and noting states 
that have partially or wholly abolished grand juries); Andrew D. Leipold, Why 
Grand Juries Do Not (and Cannot) Protect the Accused, 80 CORNELL L. REV. 
260, 274–75 (1995) (noting difficulty of getting data on grand jury screening and 
offering reasons why grand juries rarely reject requests for indictments). 
To extend the comparison, public officials (judges) have a long track record 
of doing the same task that trial and grand juries do. That available substitute 
did not lead to calls for juries’ abolition. Yet the availability of public prosecutors 
as replacements led to the U.S. jurisdictions to abolish private prosecutors. 
 95. See George Fisher, The Jury’s Rise as Lie Detector, 107 YALE L.J. 575, 
671–96 (1997) (discussing the impact of racial policies in post-Civil War jury 
and court processes). 
 96. I am aware of no historical research on African American private pros-
ecutors, and I have found no evidence of any in case law or general accounts of 
private prosecutions. 
 97. See, e.g., Fisher, supra note 95, at 684 n.514 (“[D]enial to the freedman 
of the power to testify in court against the white man . . . strikes not at a mere 
civil franchise, but at a natural right—the right of protecting life and property. 
When a white man may take a freedman’s life or property with impunity, if no 
other white men be present, the freedman has no security for either.” (quoting 
The Progress of Reconstruction, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1865, at 4)). 
 98. When Southern states were compelled to grant African American citi-
zens litigation rights, they imposed strict conditions, permitting African Amer-
icans the right to testify only when the crime victim (or the opposing civil liti-
gant) was African American. Id. at 684. Those limitations likewise restricted 
African Americans’ private prosecution authority, although in many places ra-
cial customs, backed by the prospect of racial violence, was probably discour-
agement enough. See generally DOUGLAS A. BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER 
NAME: THE RE-ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK AMERICANS FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO 
WORLD WAR II (2008) (discussing history of African Americans’ distrust of 
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states that still permitted it. States that retained a formal liti-
gation role for crime victims did so by allowing privately funded 
attorneys to assist in prosecutions filed and controlled by public 
prosecutors, thus ensuring that public officials are the exclusive 
gatekeepers of criminal law enforcement. Between the 1840s and 
1860s, prosecutors had become locally elected officials in nearly 
all states. That effectively aligned their charging monopoly with 
the preferences of local white majorities (or white minorities in 
localities in which black citizens were the majority, once South-
ern whites succeeded in disenfranchising black citizens).99 Evi-
dence for the relationship between race and the demise of private 
prosecution is correlative rather than causal, but it nonetheless 
suggests a reason for why state justice systems took a different 
path from other common-law jurisdictions and abolished private 
charging. Local white majorities had little need for a structural 
check on prosecutors they elected, and they likely did not want 
a way for African-American citizens to challenge prosecutors and 
independently pursue their interests in criminal courts. Prose-
cution redundancy would reduce the control of local majorities to 
dictate enforcement policies, including preferences for selective 
underenforcement. 
B. JUDICIAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW OF DECISIONS NOT 
TO CHARGE 
A second structure that creates some redundant authority 
over decisions not to prosecute exposes those prosecutorial deci-
sions to review, either by courts or by supervising officials within 
an administrative hierarchy. As with private prosecution, this 
mechanism is almost nonexistent among U.S. jurisdictions, with 
the significant exception of federal law. But this option has 
gained ground elsewhere, in England and throughout E.U. coun-
tries. In all these contexts, its adoption responds to demands for 
expanded victims’ rights in the criminal process. This Section 
briefly surveys prominent examples of noncharging review in 
federal law and Europe, then considers why state justice systems 
uniformly reject it. 
 
America’s judicial system); NICHOLAS LEMANN, REDEMPTION: THE LAST BAT-
TLE OF THE CIVIL WAR (2007) (exploring incidents after the Civil War and the 
impact on politics during the Reconstruction Era).  
 99. MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME 
COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL EQUALITY 49–51 (2004). Northern states 
were not models of race-blind democracy. Connecticut voters in 1865 rejected a 
proposal to enfranchise African American citizens in their state. Fisher, supra 
note 95, at 685. 
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1. Oversight of Declination Decisions in Europe 
Pursuant to an E.U. Directive,100 twenty-five of the twenty-
eight member states of the European Union grant crime victims 
formal rights to seek review of decisions not to file criminal 
charges based on their complaints.101 The details of these review 
procedures vary. Some authorize judicial review of prosecutors’ 
decisions; most jurisdictions, including Scotland and France, 
provide at least a means for review by independent officials 
within the prosecution agency, perhaps with an additional pos-
sibility for judicial review.102 Although E.U. nations with com-
mon law-based legal systems, such as Ireland, Northern Ire-
land,103 and England, have adopted versions of this practice, the 
 
 100. See Council Directive 2012/29, art. 11, 2012 O.J. (L 315) 57 (EC) (EU), 
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=CELEX:32012L0029 (re-
quiring member states to give crime victims means to challenge non-prosecution 
decisions, either through private prosecution or a right to review). 
 101. See FRA Report, supra note 72 (summarizing policies of EU member 
states and noting that only Cyprus and Malta provide victims neither right). 
 102. On Scotland, see Victims and Witnesses (Scotland) Act 2014, (ASP 1) 
§ 4 (“The Lord Advocate must make and publish rules about the process for re-
viewing, on the request of a person who is or appears to be a victim in relation 
to an offence, a decision of the prosecutor not to prosecute a person for the of-
fence.”); CROWN OFFICE & PROCURATOR FISCAL SERV., LORD ADVOCATE’S 
RULES: REVIEW OF A DECISION NOT TO PROSECUTE – SECTION 4 OF THE VICTIMS 
AND WITNESSES (SCOTLAND) ACT 2014, at 5 (2015), http://www.copfs.gov.uk/ 
images/Documents/Victims_and_Witnesses/Lord%20Avocates%20Rules%20-% 
20June%2015%20v2.pdf. On France, see Novokmet, supra note 70, at 101–02. 
In addition to judicial review, England also provides administrative review. 
See DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, VICTIMS’ RIGHT TO REVIEW GUIDANCE 6–9 
(2016), https://www.cps.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/vrr_ 
guidance_2016.pdf (noting that victims may seek administrative review of deci-
sions not to prosecute, which are checked in a local CPS office by a prosecutor 
who has not been involved with the case previously, then at the victim’s request 
in a review by the Appeals and Review Unit); Victims’ Right to Review Scheme, 
CROWN PROSECUTION SERV., https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/victims 
-right-review-scheme (last updated July 2016). Decisions are reviewed as ques-
tions of law—that is, whether they are correct as a matter of law, even if rea-
sonable. R v. Killick [2011] EWCA (Crim) 1608, [2012] 1 Crim. App. 10 [48] 
(recognizing victim right to review under EU Directive art. 10, and noting orig-
inal prosecution decision was reasonable but wrong); see also Keir Starmer, Hu-
man Rights, Victims and the Prosecution of Crime in the 21st Century, CRIM. L. 
REV. 777, 783–84 (2014) (describing aims of review policy). 
 103. See Carlin v. Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions [2010] IESC 14, 3 IR 547, at ¶ 12 
(Ir.) (“If . . . it can be demonstrated that [the DPP] reaches a decision mala fide 
or influenced by an improper motive or improper policy then his decision would 
be reviewable by a court. To that extent I reject the contention again made on 
behalf of this respondent that his decisions were not as a matter of public policy 
ever reviewable by a court.” (quoting State (McCormack) v. Curran, [1987] 
ILRM 225, 237 (Ir.))); OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF PUB. PROSECUTIONS, THE ROLE 
OF THE DPP 16 (2015), https://www.dppireland.ie/filestore/documents/victims_ 
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practice is more established in civil law jurisdictions, likely be-
cause it is consistent with the longstanding duty in some civil 
law countries of mandatory prosecution.104 
The mandatory prosecution duty, known as the “legality 
principle,” is itself a safeguard against selective underenforce-
ment due to bias or favoritism. It is primarily an anti-discrimi-
nation injunction, intended to ensure that prosecutors treat like 
cases alike, rather than a mandate to ensure public safety and 
order through full enforcement.105 Administrative and judicial 
enforceability of that duty is intended to ensure its effectiveness. 
2. Oversight of Declination Decisions in England and Wales 
The United Kingdom was an E.U. member state when the 
victim’s right Directive was issued,106 and its largest criminal 
 
directive_publications/ENGLISH_-_Role_of_the_DPP.pdf (noting crime vic-
tims, among others, can seek DPP review of prosecutors’ decisions). On North-
ern Ireland, see PUB. PROSECUTION SERV. FOR N. IR., VICTIMS OF CRIME: RE-
QUESTING A REVIEW OF A DECISION NOT TO PROSECUTE 2–4 (2017), https:// 
www.ppsni.gov.uk/Branches/PPSNI/PPSNI/Files/Documents/Rquests%20For% 
20Review/Victims%20of%20Crime%20-%20Requesting%20a%20Review% 
20of%20a%20Decision%20not%20to%20Prosecute%20(October%202017).pdf.  
 104. STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG [STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], 
§§ 152, 160, 170, translation at https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_ 
stpo/englisch_stpo.html (Ger.) (defining prosecution duty to investigate sus-
pected crime and indict when evidence is sufficient); id. §§ 171–75 (providing 
for judicial orders to prosecute, including victim’s right to seek order compelling 
prosecution); BOHLANDER, supra note 72, at 25–27, 67–71, 103–04 (describing 
German procedures to compel prosecutions under statutory legality principle); 
Novokmet, supra note 70, at 92–93. Failures to charge when required to do so 
can expose a prosecutor to discipline or even criminal liability. See STRAFGE-
SETZBUCH [STGB] [PENAL CODE], § 339, translation at https://www 
.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stgb/englisch_stgb.html (Ger.) (establishing 
that rechtsbeugung, or perversion of justice, is punishable by one to five years 
in prison); id. §§ 258, 258a (establishing punishment for police or prosecutor’s 
failure to investigate or prosecute colorable offenses).  
 105. See SHAWN MARIE BOYNE, THE GERMAN PROSECUTION SERVICE: 
GUARDIANS OF THE LAW? 8–10, 91–92 (2014) (quoting Hans-Heinrich Jescheck, 
The Discretionary Powers of the Prosecuting Attorney in West Germany, 18 AM. 
J. COMP. L. 508, 511 (1970)); Markus D. Dubber, Criminal Process in the Dual 
Penal State: A Comparative-Historical Analysis, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF 
CRIMINAL PROCESS, supra note 60; see also Klaus Sessar, Prosecutorial Discre-
tion in Germany, in THE PROSECUTOR 255, 272–73 (William F. McDonald ed., 
1979). For the German example of this principle, see STRAFPROZEßORDNUNG 
[STPO] [CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE], §§ 152, 160, 170, translation at 
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/englisch_stpo/englisch_stpo.html (Ger.) 
(defining prosecution duty to investigate suspected crime and indict when evi-
dence is sufficient). 
 106. The U.K. is scheduled to leave the European Union in 2019. See Alex 
Hunt & Brian Wheeler, Brexit: All You Need to Know About the U.K. Leaving 
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justice system—the combined jurisdictions of England and 
Wales—provides several grounds on which victims or other ag-
grieved parties may obtain both administrative and judicial re-
view of non-prosecution decisions. Yet the reasons for this relate 
foremost to public rather than private interests: “a decision not 
to prosecute, especially in circumstances where it is believed or 
asserted that the decision is or may be erroneous, can affect pub-
lic confidence in the integrity and competence of the criminal 
justice system.”107 
In line with other E.U. member states, English victims can 
seek administrative review within the Crown Prosecution Ser-
vice. The process appears to be meaningful; in recent years, be-
tween seven and thirteen percent of prosecution decisions chal-
lenged in this way have been reversed.108 Moreover, noncharging 
decisions are also subject to judicial review—a policy rarely seen 
in other common law jurisdictions.109 The standard is deferen-
tial, but English courts do periodically overturn non-prosecution 
decisions after evaluating them against written standards in the 
Code for Crown Prosecutors and other guidelines.110 English 
courts have disapproved of decisions not to prosecute upon find-
ing they were based on an unlawful policy111 or were found to be 
 
the E.U., BBC (Sept. 13, 2018), https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-32810 
887. 
 107. R (Da Silva) v. DPP [2006] EWHC (Admin) 3204 [20] (Eng. and Wales). 
 108. See Victims’ Right to Review Data, CPS, http://www.cps.gov.uk/victims_ 
witnesses/victims_right_to_review/vrr_data/index.html (last updated June 
2017) (noting that 6.8% of appeals (137 out of 1988) succeeded in 2016–17; thir-
teen percent of appeals (210 out of 1674) succeeded in 2014–15). The percentage 
of prosecution decisions challenged in this way has been well below one per-
cent—0.13% in 2016–17, and 0.17% in 2014–15—which suggests the adminis-
trative burden is manageable. See id. 
 109. See Balderstone v. R (1983), 23 Man. R. (2d) 125, at para. 28 (Can. Man. 
C.A.) (“If a judge should attempt to review the actions or conduct of the Attor-
ney-General—barring flagrant impropriety—he could be falling into a field 
which is not his and interfering with the administrative and accusatorial func-
tion of the Attorney-General or his officers. That a judge must not do.”). 
 110. Decisions to discontinue a prosecution after charging get similar scru-
tiny. For an example of a court finding wrongful a decision to discontinue pros-
ecution, see R (FB) v. DPP [2009] EWHC (Admin.) 106, [2009] Crim. App. 38, at 
¶ 70 (Eng. and Wales). On prosecutor’s nolle pros authority, see R v. B(F)  [2010] 
EWCA (Crim.) 1857, [2010] 2 Crim. App. 35, at ¶13 (Eng.); R (Gujra) v. CPS 
[2013] AC 484, at 484 (Eng. and Wales). See also R v. DPP [1995] (QB) 1 Crim. 
App. 136, at 145 (Eng.). 
 111. For leading decisions on the issue, see R v. DPP [2001] QB 330, at 344–
48 (Eng. and Wales); R (Da Silva) v. DPP [2006] EWHC (Admin) 3204 [24] (Eng. 
and Wales); Sharma v. Brown-Antoine [2006] UKPC 57, [2007] 1 WLR 780, at 
792–96 (appeal taken from Trin. And Tobogo); Marshall v. DPP [2007] UKPC 4 
(appeal taken from Jam.); R v. Metropolitan Police Commr. [1968] 2 QB 118, at 
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“perverse” under a general reasonableness standard.112 And in 
particular contrast to U.S. law with regard to lethal force by po-
lice, English judges give special scrutiny to cases that arise from 
deaths in state custody, which by their nature raise the specter 
of prosecutorial favoritism toward fellow law enforcement offi-
cials.113 
 
119–20 (Eng.); R v. DPP (Kebiline) [2000] 2 AC 326, at ¶ 2 (Eng.). England cre-
ated its prosecution agency, the Crown Prosecution Service, only in 1985. See 
Prosecution Offences Act 1985, c. 23, § 1 (Eng. and Wales); ANDREW ASHWORTH 
& MIKE REDMAYNE, THE CRIMINAL PROCESS 222–23 (4th ed. 2010). The Direc-
tor of Public Prosecutions was created in 1879 but did not handle most prosecu-
tions until the creation of the Crown Prosecution Service. In the intervening 
century, police came to dominate filing of criminal charges, supplemented by 
private prosecutions, a system that eventually was viewed as providing insuffi-
cient supervision of charging decisions by police. See Williams, supra note 78. 
 112. R (Da Silva) v. DPP [2006] EWHC (Admin) 3204 [24] (Eng. and Wales) 
(summarizing three grounds for review and citing R v. DPP [1995] (QB) 1 Crim. 
App. 136 (Eng.)); R (Guest) v. DPP [2009] EWHC (Admin.) 594, [2009] 2 Crim. 
App. 26, at ¶ 34 (Eng. and Wales); R v. General Council of the Bar [1990] 3 All 
ER 137 (QB), at 137–38 (Eng. and Wales). For an overview, see ASHWORTH & 
REDMAYNE, supra note 111; Christopher Hilson, Discretion to Prosecute and Ju-
dicial Review, CRIM. L. REV. 739 (1993) (examining case law regarding prose-
cution decisions and subsequent judicial review); Appeals: Judicial Review of 
Prosecutorial Decisions, CPS, https://www.cps.gov.uk/legal-guidance/appeals 
-judicial-review-prosecutorial-decisions (last updated May 21, 2009). 
The European Convention on Human Rights may impose affirmative obli-
gations on member states that certain instances require prosecutions, or that 
more generally require a state to maintain a criminal justice system that pro-
vides sufficient protection to citizens. English courts found that their estab-
lished standards of review of noncharging decisions, based in domestic law, have 
been held sufficient to meet any such obligation. See R (FB) v. DPP [2009] 
EWHC (Admin.) 106, [2009] Crim. App. 38, at ¶ 64 (Eng. and Wales) (discussing 
state obligations under Articles 2 and 3); see also R v. Killick [2011] EWCA 
(Crim.) 1608, [2012] 1 Crim. App. 10 at [48] (confirming victims’ right to review). 
Judges may require disclosure of internal prosecution documents, but they as-
sess the lawfulness of nonprosecution without examining the underlying evi-
dence. See R (Da Silva) v. DPP [2006] EWHC (Admin) 3204 [24] (Eng. and 
Wales) (noting use of redacted investigative report and case notes from CPS but 
disavowing evaluation of evidence). 
 113. See R v. DPP [2001] QB 330 at 337 (Eng. and Wales); R v. Metro. Police 
Commr. [1958] 2 QB 118, at 123–25 (Eng. and Wales); ASHWORTH & REDMAYNE, 
supra note 111, at 221–22. Decisions by U.S. courts give no special solicitude to 
instances of nonprosecution in the wake of injuries or deaths caused by prison 
guards or other law enforcement officials. See, e.g., Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 
U.S. 84, 85–87 (1981) (rejecting state prison inmates’ federal civil claim alleging 
bad faith by state officials to block issuance of arrest warrants against guards 
on allegations of unnecessary beatings during prison uprising); Inmates of At-
tica Corr. Facility v. Rockefeller, 477 F.2d 375, 382–83 (2d Cir. 1973) (rejecting 
request, on behalf of inmates injured or killed by state prison guards in the wake 
of a prison riot, that federal courts compel state and federal prosecutors to 
charge guards, reaffirming that prosecutorial discretion is immune to judicial 
review). 
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3. Federal Oversight of Declination Decisions 
In the United States, only the federal justice system pro-
vides for a process of administrative review somewhat compara-
ble to those in E.U. member states. Federal law grants victims a 
right to seek review of prosecutors’ decisions within the Depart-
ment of Justice hierarchy, although it also explicitly bars judi-
cial review of Justice Department decisions in this process.114 
Although decision makers in an internal review process have 
less institutional independence from those they review than do 
judges engaged in judicial review, they also have a comparative 
advantage in institutional expertise, which could translate into 
less deference to, and more meaningful oversight of, front-line 
prosecutors. 
In addition, federal law guarantees victims “[t]he reasona-
ble right to confer with the attorney for the Government in the 
case.”115 The Department of Justice interprets this not to create 
a right to confer before charges are filed, reasoning that no “case” 
exists until charges are filed.116 Some lower courts have inter-
preted the statute differently, however, and concluded that it 
 
To facilitate review, English prosecutors in some circumstances must pro-
vide public reasons for choosing not to file charges. See Jordan v. United King-
dom (No. 2) [2003] 37 Eur. Ct. H.R. 52 ¶¶ 82–86, 122–23, 142–45 (holding that 
under article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights prosecutors 
should give reasons explaining a decision not to bring criminal charges after an 
investigation into a death caused by police shootings); see also R v. DPP [2001] 
QB 330, at 347 (Lord Bingham, CJ) (Eng. and Wales) (“In the absence of com-
pelling grounds for not giving reasons, we would expect the Director to give rea-
sons in such a case [of non-prosecution]: to meet the reasonable expectation of 
interested parties that either a prosecution will follow or a reasonable explana-
tion for not prosecuting be given . . . .”); EU Council Directive 2012/29, supra 
note 100, art. 6, at 67 (requiring explanations to victims that can be subjected 
to review). Irish victim rights laws that took effect in 2015 now require prose-
cutors to provide reasons to victims for declining to prosecute. See Mark Hilli-
ard, New Laws on Rights of Crime Victims are Criticized, IRISH TIMES (Nov. 16, 
2015), http://www.irishtimes.com/news/crime-and-law/new-laws-on-rights-of 
-crime-victims-are-criticised-1.2431095. By contrast, see Singer v. United 
States, 380 U.S. 24, 34–37 (1965) (holding that due to judicial “confidence in the 
integrity of the federal prosecutor,” U.S. attorneys need not give reasons for re-
fusing to consent to defendant’s waiver of jury trial). For rare examples of U.S. 
rules requiring prosecutors to give reasons for not charging, see COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 16-5-209 (2014) (requiring prosecutor’s reasons upon private complaint 
objecting to non-prosecution); PA. R. CRIM. P. 506. 
 114. Review within the U.S. Justice Department hierarchy is mandated by 
18 U.S.C. § 3771(f )  (2016); see also id. § 3771(f ) (2)(D) (protecting Justice De-
partment decisions from judicial review). 
 115. See 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(5). 
 116. The Availability of Crime Victims’ Rights Under the Crime Victims’ 
Rights Act of 2004, 35 Op. O.L.C. 8 (2010). For a vigorous argument against the 
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creates an enforceable right for victims to confer with prosecu-
tors before, and about, the charging decision. One held that pros-
ecutors cannot enter a non-prosecution agreement with a sus-
pect until they confer with victims, and that if they fail to do so 
the court can order prosecutors to re-open the non-prosecution 
agreement.117 A few other lower federal courts have reached sim-
ilar conclusions,118 although at least two have opposing conclu-
sions.119 
Even in its stronger form, this is a limited entitlement, in 
effect, to an opportunity to try to influence charging decisions. 
Even the most aggressive federal courts on this point do not ex-
amine prosecutors’ good faith during consultations or their rea-
sons for disagreeing with victims. In sum, neither the consulta-
tion right nor the right to review by Justice Department 
supervisors infringes federal prosecutors’ monopoly power over 
charging from judicial oversight. 
 
OLC position, see Paul Cassell et al., Crime Victims’ Rights During Criminal 
Investigations? Applying the Crime Victims’ Rights Act Before Criminal Charges 
Are Filed, 104 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 59, 61–63 (2014) (arguing for victims’ 
right to confer and that the right to fair treatment extends to pre-charging 
stage). 
 117. Doe v. United States, 950 F. Supp. 2d 1262, 1267–68 (S.D. Fla. 2013) 
(re-opening and setting aside a pre-charge non-prosecution agreement between 
prosecutors and defense because prosecutor had not consulted with victim in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 3771). 
 118. See In re Dean, 527 F.3d 391, 395 (5th Cir. 2008) (acknowledging lower 
court’s interpretation of § 3771(a) before any prosecution is underway); Does v. 
United States, 817 F. Supp. 2d 1337, 1342–45 (S.D. Fla. 2011) (recognizing that 
18 U.S.C. § 3771(a) can apply before formal charges are filed); Jordan v. Dep’t 
of Justice, 173 F. Supp. 3d 44, 52 (S.D.N.Y. 2016) (citing In re Dean, 527 F.3d 
at 395); United States v. BP Prod. N. Am., Inc., No. H-07-434, 2008 WL 501321, 
at *11 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 21, 2008) (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 3771 and a broad duty 
to confer before charges are filed). Another district court refused prosecutors’ 
request to dismiss charges before the prosecutor consulted the victim. United 
States v. Heaton 458 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1272 (D. Utah 2006) (citing victim’s right 
under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a)(8) “to be treated with fairness and with respect for 
[her] dignity and privacy”). 
 119. See In re Petersen, No. 2:10-CV-298 RM, 2010 WL 5108692, at *2 (N.D. 
Ind. Dec. 8, 2010) (concluding that prosecutors control charging decisions and 
certain victim rights under 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a), including the right “‘to confer 
with the attorney for the Government in the case,’ . . . arise only after charges 
have been brought against a defendant and a case has been opened,” although 
a “victim’s ‘right to be treated with fairness and with respect for [his or her] 
dignity and privacy,’ . . . may apply before any prosecution is underway” (quot-
ing 18 U.S.C. § 3771(a))); cf. United States v. Rubin, 558 F. Supp. 2d 411, 419 
(E.D.N.Y. 2008) (assuming without deciding that some federal victim rights 
may apply before any prosecution is under way, but “cannot be read to include 
the victims of uncharged crimes that the government has not even contem-
plated . . . [or] has not verified to at least an elementary degree”). 
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4. Oversight of Declination Decisions in State Justice Systems 
State justice systems do not go as far as the federal system 
does, much less provide the kind of oversight or victim recourse 
that European systems now offer. And this is so despite the fact 
that all states have adopted substantial victims’ bills of rights, 
nearly all of which include rights for victims to consult with pros-
ecutors. Most make clear that the consultation right attaches 
only after the prosecutor decides to file charges.120 Rights of ad-
ministrative review are rare.121 One reason for that is surely 
structural. The U.S. Department of Justice is a hierarchically 
organized agency within which all federal prosecutors operate, a 
structure that enables supervisory and quasi-independent re-
view within the agency. But few states follow that model. In-
stead, prosecutors in most states are locally elected and operate 
 
 120. Many state laws grant victims a right to consult only “after the crime 
against the victim has been charged” or “regarding the charges filed.” Others 
create only a general right to confer, or “to communicate,” “with the prosecu-
tion.” E.g., ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 24 (granting “the right to confer with the 
prosecution”); ARIZ. CONST. art. 2, § 2.1(A)(6) (granting the right to “confer with 
the prosecution, after the crime against the victim has been charged, before trial 
or before any disposition of the case and to be informed of the disposition”); CAL. 
CONST. art. I, § 28(b)(6) (granting the right to “reasonably confer with the pros-
ecuting agency, upon request, regarding . . . the charges filed . . . .”); IDAHO 
CONST. art. I, § 22(5) (granting the right to “communicate with the prosecu-
tion”); ILL. CONST. art. I, § 8.1(a)(4) (granting the right to “communicate with 
the prosecution”); IND. CONST. art. I, § 13(b) (amended 1996) (granting the right 
to “confer with the prosecution”); LA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (granting the “right to 
confer with the prosecution prior to final disposition of the case”); MICH. CONST. 
art. I, § 24(1) (granting the “right to confer with the prosecution”); N.M. CONST. 
art. 2, § 24(A)(6) (granting the “right to confer with the prosecution”); N.C. 
CONST. art. I, § 37(1)(h) (granting the “right as prescribed by law to confer with 
the prosecution”); OR. CONST. art. I, § 42(1)(f )  (granting the “right to be con-
sulted, upon request, regarding plea negotiations involving any violent felony”); 
S.C. CONST. art. I, § 24(A)(7) (granting the right to “confer with the prosecution, 
after the crime against the victim has been charged, before the trial or before 
any disposition and informed of the disposition”); TENN. CONST. art. I, § 35(a) 
(granting the “right to confer with the prosecution”); TEX. CONST. art. I, 
§ 30(b)(3) (granting the “right to confer with a representative of the prosecutor’s 
office”); VA. CONST. art. I, § 8-A(7) (granting the “right to confer with the prose-
cution”); WIS. CONST. art. I, § 9m (granting an “opportunity to confer with the 
prosecution”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 9405 (2018); GA. CODE ANN. § 17-17-11 
(2018); HAW. REV. STAT. § 801D-4(a)(1) (2017) (granting the right of victim to 
be informed of the final disposition of the case); NEB. REV. STAT. 29-120 (2017) 
(requiring the prosecution to make a good faith effort to consult with victim); 
N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 642(1) (LexisNexis 2018) (providing standards for fair treat-
ment of victims); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2930.06(A) (LexisNexis 2018) (stating 
that the “prosecutor . . . shall confer with the victim in the case before pretrial 
diversion is granted . . . [or] before amending or dismissing a charge”). 
 121. No rights of administrative review are specified in the state victims’ 
rights laws cited supra note 120. 
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autonomously from state justice departments or attorneys gen-
eral, which generally exercise little, if any, oversight.122 Admin-
istrative review of state prosecutors’ charging decisions is simply 
not feasible without major reorganization of state justice sys-
tems. 
That structural barrier probably explains why state prose-
cutors’ decisions are functionally immune to administrative 
oversight, but the lack of judicial oversight has a different origin. 
In accord with common law tradition, state and federal courts 
have never meaningfully reviewed public prosecutors’ noncharg-
ing decisions.123 In particular, they have unambiguously rejected 
victims’ claims of standing to challenge those decisions.124 A few 
 
 122. Five states place all their prosecutors within a single state agency, 
which at least potentially makes possible hierarchical oversight. In New Jersey, 
Connecticut, Rhode Island, Delaware, and Alaska, local prosecutors are ap-
pointed by, and under the supervision of, the state attorney general. See STEVEN 
W. PERRY, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, PROSECU-
TORS IN STATE COURTS, 2005, at 2 (2006), https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ 
psc05.pdf (noting Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey do not elect prosecutors; 
Delaware and Rhode Island elect attorneys general who appoint all prosecutors; 
all other states elect prosecutors at the local level). Id. at 11. For an example of 
a state attorney general’s limited authority over locally elected prosecutors, see, 
for example, VA. CODE § 2.2-511 (2018). 
 123. Equal protection and due process doctrines nominally empower courts 
to review charging decisions motivated by racial bias or retaliation for exercis-
ing fundamental rights, and inquiry into selective charging implicitly requires 
examining biased declinations as well. But these doctrines are wholly deferen-
tial to prosecutorial discretion. See United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 
469 (1996) (holding that equal protection doctrine bars racially biased charg-
ing); Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607–08 (1985) (holding that due 
process bars charging in retaliation for exercising fundamental rights); see also 
McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 312–314 (1987) (holding that statistical evi-
dence of bias in death penalty administration insufficient to prove constitu-
tional violation without proving purposeful discrimination in defendant’s case). 
For a classic account, see KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A 
PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188, 207–08 (1969) (“The affirmative power to prosecute 
is enormous, but the negative power to withhold prosecution may be even 
greater, because it is less protected against abuse. . . . The plain fact is that 
nine-tenths of local prosecutors’ decisions are supervised or reviewed by no 
one.”). 
 124. Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973) (rejecting private 
plaintiff ’s challenge on federal equal protection grounds to state policy of pros-
ecuting only married men for failures to pay child support, concluding “in Amer-
ican jurisprudence at least, a private citizen lacks a judicially cognizable inter-
est in the prosecution or nonprosecution of another”); Leeke v. Timmerman, 454 
U.S. 83, 84 (1981) (extending Linda R.S. to hold that private citizens have “no 
cognizable interest” in process by which magistrates decide whether to issue 
warrants on criminal complaints); cf. Inmates of Attica Corr. Facility v. Rocke-
feller, 477 F.2d 375, 382–83 (2d Cir. 1973) (rejecting purported crime victims’ 
request that court order prosecutors to charge). 
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limited exceptions prove the rule. In cases of private criminal 
complaints filed by alleged victims, Colorado, Michigan, Ne-
braska, and Pennsylvania authorize judges to review public 
prosecutors’ decisions not to charge.125 Even when statutes grant 
courts the power to review (or even mandate review) of charging 
and dismissal decisions, state judges consistently have refused 
to scrutinize the merits of prosecutors’ judgments. Many states 
have replaced the common law rule that gave prosecutors com-
plete discretion to nolle prosequi (or dismiss) any criminal charge 
with statutes that require judges to confirm that non-prosecu-
tion is in the interest of justice.126 Yet courts uniformly refuse to 
engage in meaningful review, inferring instead that those stat-
utes require deference to prosecutors.127 
 
 125. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 16-5-209 (2017) (“The judge of a court hav-
ing jurisdiction of the alleged offense, upon affidavit filed with the judge alleging 
the commission of a crime and the unjustified refusal of the prosecuting attor-
ney to prosecute any person for the crime, may require the prosecuting attorney 
to appear before the judge and explain the refusal. If . . . the judge finds that 
the refusal of the prosecuting attorney to prosecute was arbitrary or capricious 
and without reasonable excuse, the judge may order the prosecuting attorney 
to file an information and prosecute the case or may appoint a special prosecutor 
to do so.”); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 767.41 (2017) (“[I]f, upon examination, the court 
is not satisfied with the [prosecution’s] statement, the prosecuting attorney 
shall be directed by the court to file the proper information and bring the case 
to trial.”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-1606 (2017) (“[I]f, upon such examination, the 
court shall not be satisfied with the [prosecution’s] statement, the county attor-
ney shall be directed by the court to file the proper information and bring the 
case to trial.”); PA. R. CRIM. P. 506(B)(2) (requiring prosecutors to give reasons 
for declining to prosecute a criminal complaint filed by a private party, and per-
mitting “the affiant [to] petition the court of common pleas for review of the 
decision”); In re Hickson, 2000 PA Super 402, ¶¶ 12–19 (describing victim stand-
ing to seek judicial review of decisions not to prosecute based on private com-
plaints); see also State ex rel. Clyde v. Lauder, 90 N.W. 564, 569 (N.D. 1902) 
(“[T]he more modern rule, and that adopted in this state, is the reverse of that 
at common law. In this state, while the prosecutor may file with the court his 
reasons for not filing an information . . . it is the province of the court to deter-
mine the ultimate question whether the case shall be prosecuted or dismissed.”); 
cf. Olsen v. Koppy, 593 N.W.2d 762, 765–67 (N.D. 1999) (citing Lauder, 90 N.W. 
564, with approval). 
 126. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1385 (West 2016) (“The judge or magistrate 
may, either of his or her own motion or upon the application of the prosecuting 
attorney, and in the furtherance of justice, order an action to be dismissed.”); 
DARRYL K. BROWN, FREE MARKET CRIMINAL JUSTICE 35–37 (2016); Valena E. 
Beety, Judicial Dismissals in the Interest of Justice, 80 MO. L. REV. 629, 640–
43 (2015) (advocating for a shift in court-reviewed dismissals). 
 127. New York granted courts nolle prosequi authority in 1829, during its 
era of private and judicially appointed prosecutors. MCCONVILLE & MIRSKY, su-
pra note 81, at 35 (citing 1829 N.Y. REV. STAT. tit. IV, § 68, p.730 & § 54. p.726). 
For a broad overview of state nolle pros laws, see Annotation, Power of Court to 
Enter Nolle Prosequi or Dismiss Prosecution, 69 A.L.R. 240 (1930). The federal 
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This is a stark contrast with European justice systems, but 
U.S. jurisdictions are not alone in shielding prosecution deci-
sions from judicial oversight. Aside from England and Wales, 
courts in other common law jurisdictions—notably Canada and 
Australia—take roughly the same approach and defer to prose-
cutorial charging discretion.128 
5. Summary of Declination Oversight 
Both private prosecution and review procedures provide a 
kind of redundancy that checks prosecutorial declination deci-
sions, and both can do so in service of public interests as well as 
victims’ private interests. Both options have some capacity to 
challenge prosecutorial judgments affected by political or per-
sonal biases, institutional allegiances (especially between police 
and local politicians), or other illicit sources of favor or disfavor. 
As one commentator put it in the English context, private pros-
ecution authority recognizes that victims possess some capacity 
to be independent “assessors of the evidence as well as the public 
interest.”129 Review procedures enable judges and supervisory 
 
rule is FED. R. CRIM. P. 48(a). Note that these rules give judges implicit power 
to compel prosecutors to litigate charges they would rather dismiss. For deci-
sions insisting on judicial deference, see, for example, Genesee Prosecutor v. 
Genesee Circuit Judge, 215 N.W.2d 145, 147–48 (Mich. 1974). For similar ex-
amples in federal cases, see United States v. Smith, 55 F.3d 157, 159–60 (4th 
Cir. 1995); United States v. Perate, 719 F.2d 706, 710–11 (4th Cir. 1983); United 
States v. Smith, 853 F. Supp. 179, 183–84 (M.D.N.C. 1994); Dawsey v. Gov’t of 
Virgin Islands, 931 F. Supp. 397, 402–04 (D.V.I. 1996). 
A standard explanation for deference is that judges lack means to compel 
prosecutors to litigate charges at trial. See, e.g., United States v. Greater Blouse, 
Skirt & Neckwear Contractors Ass’n, 228 F. Supp. 483, 489–90 (S.D.N.Y. 1964) 
(“Even were leave of Court to the dismissal of the indictment denied, the Attor-
ney General would still have the right to . . . , in the exercise of his discretion, 
decline to move the case for trial. The Court in that circumstance would be with-
out power to issue a mandamus or other order to compel prosecution of the in-
dictment, since such a direction would invade the traditional separation of pow-
ers doctrine.”). But judges have options short of mandamus. Presumably they 
could hold prosecutors in contempt for failures to appear, as they could for all 
other attorneys. And whenever prosecutors retain an interest charges they seek 
to dismiss, judges could incentivize them by ruling that failure to litigate 
charges results (as for civil parties) in forfeiture of the claim, or dismissal with 
prejudice. 
 128. For an overview of Canadian law on this point, see Mark Phillips, The 
Public Interest Criterion in Prosecutorial Discretion: A Lingering Source of Flex-
ibility in the Canadian Criminal Process?, 36 WINDSOR REV. LEGAL & SOC. IS-
SUES 43 (2015) (describing case law requiring great judicial deference to prose-
cutorial discretion). For Australia cases on prosecutorial discretion, see Miller v 
Commonwealth Dir. of Pub. Prosecutions [2005] 142 FCR 394, 399–400 (Austl.).  
 129. Manikis, supra note 60, at 29. In addition, many nineteenth-century 
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officials to do much the same thing, without the cost barriers for 
victims posed by private prosecutions. (Although it may well be 
that poorer victims are less likely even to petition for review, es-
pecially if they lack legal counsel to press their review requests.) 
Why, then, have U.S. jurisdictions so uniformly rejected 
both options? As noted, both racial politics and the power of com-
mon law tradition are probable contributing reasons.130 Another 
is the singular choice of most state justice systems to make pros-
ecutors locally elected officials, which does much to prevent 
kinds of over- and underenforcement disfavored by local majori-
ties. That, in turn, likely reduces pressure for reforms that would 
improve other safeguards against decisions not to prosecute—
especially decisions that cut against popular local preferences, 
which in many communities include rigorous prosecution of ex-
cessive police uses of force. Finally, another institution responds 
to some of the same underenforcement problems that private 
prosecution and judicial review could address—redundant pros-
ecution authority in a federal system. 
C. FEDERALISM SAFEGUARDS ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION 
The scope of the U.S. federal criminal code expanded vastly 
in the twentieth century, as did the federal government’s insti-
tutional capacity to enforce that code and its regulatory author-
ity more generally. The result has been a distinctive form of 
criminal justice federalism: federal enforcement authority 
wholly overlaps the territorial scope of state criminal law, and 
the federal code substantially overlaps much of what is covered 
in state criminal codes. The resulting structure of redundant fed-
eral-state authority has evolved into a means—unusual even 
among federal nation-states—to second-guess and effectively 
trump state prosecutors’ declination decisions without empower-
ing courts or private parties. 
No other nation built on a federal model incorporates nearly 
 
state courts justified privately funded prosecutions by citing the public value of 
these contributions to supplement underfunded district attorney offices. See Ire-
land, supra note 83, at 47, 49–51 (citing and quoting multiple state courts). Pri-
vate prosecutors may have different reasons to proceed when despite compara-
tively low odds of winning a conviction. Some of those motivations, at least, can 
be public-regarding. Avlana Eisenberg makes the point that prosecuting hate 
crimes cases, for example, can have expressive and educative value that justifies 
pursuing well-grounded cases despite skeptical juries. Eisenberg, supra note 45, 
at 893–95, 902–18. 
 130. For discussions on the common law aversion to private prosecution, see 
Ireland, supra note 83 and for a review of the impact of racial tensions on pri-
vate prosecution, see BLACKMON, supra note 98. 
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the same degree of redundancy between state and federal justice 
systems.131 The more common model of criminal justice federal-
ism is found in Canada and Germany: each has a single national 
criminal code that is administered by separate state-level prose-
cution agencies and court systems.132 Other federal states follow 
the U.S. model and have separate criminal codes, prosecution 
agencies, and court systems in each state as well as for the fed-
eral government. Australia follows this model, but the scope and 
jurisdiction of Australian federal criminal law is much more lim-
ited than is U.S. federal law; federal crimes are largely confined 
to offenses that implicate distinct federal interests—it is proba-
bly closer to U.S. federal criminal law in 1910 than 2010. The 
result is that in Australia federal criminal law enforcement over-
laps much less with state criminal law.133 
The broad redundancy provided by U.S. federalism enables 
federal prosecutors to serve as checks on underenforcement by 
state prosecutors, at least for some large and important catego-
 
 131. Some federal states such as Germany and Canada lack enforcement re-
dundancy because they use a single, nationwide, criminal code, which is en-
forced for prosecution agencies and courts organized at the state or provincial 
level. See generally ERIC P. POLTEN & ERIC GLEZL, FEDERALISM IN CANADA AND 
GERMANY: OVERVIEW AND COMPARISON (2014) (describing similarities in Ger-
man and Canadian federalism, including allocating authority over substantive 
criminal law to the federal government but criminal justice administration to 
state or provincial prosecutors and courts). In Australia, like in the United 
States, states and the federal government each have their own criminal codes. 
But Australian federal criminal authority is confined much more narrowly than 
in the United States to conduct that implicates a distinct federal interest. See 
generally ARTHER B. GUNLICKS, THE LÄNDER AND GERMAN FEDERALISM 59, 72, 
129 (2003) (describing German criminal affairs and jurisdictions as compared 
to the United States); POLTEN & GLEZL, supra, at 5–6, 10, 13–14; Brian Galli-
gan, Comparative Federalism, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTI-
TUTIONS 261, 266–75 (Sarah A. Binder et al. eds., 2008) (discussing federalism 
and judicial review and regulations); Kathleen Daly & Rick Sarre, Criminal 
Justice System: Aims and Processes, in CRIME AND JUSTICE: A GUIDE TO CRIMI-
NOLOGY 357 (Darren Palmer et al. eds., 5th ed. 2017) (examining the processes 
and purposes of the criminal justice system); Vicki Waye & Paul Marcus, Aus-
tralia and the United States: Two Common Criminal Justice Systems Uncom-
monly at Odds, Part 2, 18 TUL. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 335 (2010) (highlighting 
similarities and differences between the two countries in relation to criminal 
laws and policies). 
 132. Since 2011, Switzerland also now has unified national criminal law and 
procedure codes administered in all cantons. See Anna Petrig, The Expansion of 
Swiss Criminal Jurisdiction in Light of International Law, 9 UTRECHT L. REV. 
34, 36 (2013). 
 133. See Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 s 10(2); Annual Report 
2014–15, supra note 71. 
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ries of crime. In effect, federal prosecutors can review the decli-
nation decisions of state prosecutors—as well as the adequacy 
and success of their prosecutions—and then decide whether to 
file federal charges in cases that their state counterparts de-
clined to pursue, charged too leniently, or in which they failed to 
win a conviction or sufficiently harsh sanctions. (In theory state 
prosecutors conduct the same oversight over much of federal en-
forcement practice, but this is less common.)134 State prosecu-
tors’ decisions, at least for certain categories of serious wrongdo-
ing, face de facto review by federal executive officials.  
Or so the law for a century has permitted. The constitutional 
double jeopardy doctrine since at least 1922 has recognized the 
“dual sovereignty” of state and federal governments. Notwith-
standing the guarantee that no person shall “be subject for the 
same offence to be twice put in jeopardy,” the Double Jeopardy 
Clause has been understood not to preclude federal prosecutors’ 
power to charge a person who has previously been prosecuted by 
state officials for the same criminal conduct, and federal prose-
cutions likewise do not limit subsequent state enforcement ef-
forts.135 By granting certiorari in United States v. Gamble this 
term,136 the U.S. Supreme Court is set to revisit this doctrine, 
which provides the foundation for the federalism-based check on 
underenforcement. 
Federal prosecutors do not attempt to keep an eye on all 
state prosecution decisions and practices, and federal criminal 
 
 134. In unusual circumstances, two states may also have concurrent juris-
diction over the same crime, enabling one to assess the adequacy of the other’s 
enforcement effort. For a rare example, see Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82, 91–
93 (1985). 
 135. See U.S. CONST. amend. V (Double Jeopardy Clause); Bartkus v. Illi-
nois, 359 U.S. 121, 136–39 (1959) (affirming power of state to prosecute defend-
ant after a federal prosecution for the same bank robbery); United States v. 
Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 384–85 (1922) (approving federal prosecution after state 
prosecution based on same conduct). 
 136. See United States v. Gamble, 694 Fed. App’x. 750 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. 
granted, Gamble v. United States, 138 S. Ct. 2707 (2018). Even if the Court 
abolishes the dual sovereignty doctrine in Gamble, federal and state prosecutors 
will continue to be able to prosecute the same offenders for the same conduct in 
many cases. Under Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932), the 
Double Jeopardy Clause precludes multiple prosecutions only if the subsequent 
charge has the “same elements” as the first. See United States v. Dixon, 509 
U.S. 688, 696 (1993) (affirming Blockburger ’s same-elements test as the sole 
basis for double jeopardy claims). Unlike the firearm offenses that gave rise to 
Gamble’s Double Jeopardy claim, federal and state crimes covering the same 
conduct often have distinct elements. For an example, see infra notes 200–02 
and accompanying text. 
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law is not fully coextensive with state criminal law; significant 
gaps are discussed in the next Part. But the substantive redun-
dancy is considerable. For some areas of dual authority—such as 
drug crimes, fraud, child pornography, and human trafficking—
federal and state agencies often coordinate investigative efforts 
and divide up prosecution responsibilities. But federal Justice 
Department policy to exercise oversight of state enforcement 
practices in certain categories of crime is deliberate and formal-
ized. Notable examples include state and local government cor-
ruption, excessive use of force and other wrongdoing by police, 
and other criminal civil rights violations.137 Especially in these 
areas, federal prosecutors assess whether to file their own 
charges in cases in which their state counterparts declined to 
charge, charged too leniently, or in which they failed to win ap-
propriate convictions. Federal prosecution in the wake of state 
declination is hardly the norm—it should not be, if state prose-
cutors decline cases for the right reasons138—but federal officials 
do remedy meaningful enforcement gaps left by state prosecu-
tors.139 
Functionally, this inter-governmental model of review re-
sembles intra-agency administrative review with greater inde-
pendence between initial decision makers and subsequent re-
viewers. Oversight of state prosecutors rests with the policy 
 
 137. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, 
supra note 55, § 9-2.031 (explaining the “Petite policy” criteria for federal pros-
ecution of same conduct after state prosecution). 
 138. For an example of a high-profile federal declination in the wake of state 
declination, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE REPORT RE-
GARDING THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION INTO THE SHOOTING DEATH OF MI-
CHAEL BROWN BY FERGUSON, MISSOURI POLICE OFFICER DARREN WILSON 5–9 
(2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/ 
attachments/2015/03/04/doj_report_on_shooting_of_michael_brown_1.pdf. For 
a study of federal declination, see Reuters, U.S. Police Escape Federal Charges 
in 96% of Rights Cases, FORTUNE (Mar. 13, 2016), http://fortune.com/2016/03/ 
13/us-police-federal-charges-data (explaining that between 1995 and 2015, 
“[federal] prosecutors turned down 12,703 potential civil rights violations out of 
13,233 total complaints. By contrast, prosecutors rejected only about 23 percent 
of referrals in all other types of criminal cases”). 
 139. See, e.g., Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 113–14 (1996) (remanding 
for new sentence calculation of police officers convicted in federal court after 
acquittals in state court); Blinder, supra note 52 (describing federal conviction 
of South Carolina police officer after an unsuccessful homicide prosecution of 
the officer in state court); Seven Baltimore City Police Officers Arrested for Abus-
ing Power in Federal Racketeering Conspiracy, U.S. DEP’T JUST. (Mar. 1, 
2017), https://www.justice.gov/usao-md/pr/seven-baltimore-city-police-officers 
-arrested-abusing-power-federal-racketeering. 
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priorities of federal executive branch officials. The Justice De-
partment has well-established written guidelines for much of 
this oversight activity, although they are not formally binding.140 
Although the Justice Department bureaucracy has a stronger in-
stitutional culture of professionalism than many state prosecu-
tor offices, departmental policies and priorities can change sub-
stantially with presidential administrations—as they have 
recently.141 Nonetheless, this federalism-based model of prosecu-
torial oversight has an advantage shared by the administrative 
review schemes within single prosecution agencies. In both set-
tings, those with review power are prosecutors who should have 
greater institutional competence and legitimacy to second-guess 
other prosecutors’ charging decisions, and consequently less in-
clination than courts to defer to prosecutorial judgments. 
This federalist model of enforcement redundancy did not 
evolve from earlier common law institutional arrangements, like 
private prosecution, nor from the modern victims’ rights move-
ment, like judicial and administrative review of decisions not to 
prosecute. Federal criminal law enforcement expanded for sev-
eral reasons, but behind many of those reasons is a common pur-
pose: to remedy glaring patterns of underenforcement by the 
states. For example, federal law and institutional capacity (such 
as the advent of the Federal Bureau of Investigation) expanded 
in response to states’ inability to confront adequately the rise of 
interstate violence and drug crimes (as well as, for a time, pro-
hibition on alcohol manufacture and distribution).142 Federal law 
 
 140. Moreover, internal Justice Department decisions are not subject to ju-
dicial review. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL RESOURCE MANUAL 
§ 162 (2016); U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEYS’ MANUAL, su-
pra note 55, § 9-2.031. 
 141. For a recent example of change in Justice Department policies, see Eric 
Lichtblau, Sessions Indicates Justice Department Will Stop Monitoring Trou-
bled Police Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/ 
2017/02/28/us/politics/jeff-sessions-crime.html. On Justice Department profes-
sionalism, see JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFFY, MAIN JUSTICE: THE MEN AND 
WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE NATION’S CRIMINAL LAWS AND GUARD ITS LIBER-
TIES 7–9 (1996); Jed Handelsman Shugerman, The Creation of the Department 
of Justice: Professionalization Without Civil Rights or Civil Service, 66 STAN. L. 
REV. 121, 125–26 (2014). 
 142. The arguable exceptions are federal crimes for race-based and civil 
rights-related violence and for local officials’ abuses of power; in those realms 
federal authorities responded to widespread failures by state law enforcement 
and justice systems. See generally MICHAL R. BELKNAP, FEDERAL LAW AND 
SOUTHERN ORDER: RACIAL VIOLENCE AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT IN THE 
POST-BROWN SOUTH 154–58 (1987) (highlighting the federal response to south-
ern violence in mid-twentieth century); RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES, THE FBI: A 
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took on the primary role in combatting local government corrup-
tion—including police corruption and excessive uses of force—
which local prosecution agencies often lacked the ability, or po-
litical independence, to confront.143 And federal law has long at-
tempted to fill the gap when racially biased local police, prosecu-
tors, and juries declined to arrest, prosecute, or convict 
suspects—especially white ones—who victimized black citi-
zens.144 In sum, the redundant enforcement authority developed 
as part of the modern model U.S. federalism has much in com-
mon, in functional terms, with private prosecution and review of 
prosecutorial declination decisions. All are mechanisms to guard 
against unjustified nonenforcement, or underenforcement, by ju-
risdictions’ primary prosecution agencies. The next Part exam-
ines the relative strengths of these alternatives. 
III.  PROS AND CONS OF FEDERALISM-BASED 
ENFORCEMENT REDUNDANCY   
A. COMPARATIVE LIMITS OF ENFORCEMENT-OVERSIGHT 
STRATEGIES 
Each of the institutional approaches to reducing underen-
forcement of criminal law by public prosecutors has comparative 
strengths and weaknesses. All three share the common virtue of 
being a means to reduce instances of bias, favoritism, or other 
misjudgments that result in unjustified nonenforcement. All 
three enable outside reevaluation of declination decisions. Pri-
vate prosecution empowers motivated private parties—crime 
victims—to initiate the challenge to a public prosecutor’s deci-
sion not to charge by filing charges themselves. The same is true 
in jurisdictions that subject declination decisions to formal ad-
ministrative or judicial review; victims trigger that process by 
petitioning for an independent evaluation. Both of those prac-
tices harness the motivations of interested private parties to, in 
effect, screen which declination decisions should be subject to re-
assessment, although private prosecution poses a significant 
cost barrier for victims who want to take advantage of it. At the 
same time, both of these practices give public officials the final 
 
HISTORY 19–24 (2007) (tracing FBI to nineteenth century federal efforts to com-
bat Ku Klux Klan terrorism of voters); WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, THE COLLAPSE OF 
AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 99–157 (2011) (documenting the expansion of fed-
eral role in law enforcement and prosecution in the late nineteenth century). 
 143. See infra Part III.B.1. 
 144. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, 110–14 (1945). 
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word on whether a prosecution (public or private) will proceed. 
The federalism route to prosecutorial oversight, by contrast, 
gives private parties no formal role, although victims can file 
complaints and lobby federal prosecutors just as they can with 
local police and prosecutors for any alleged crime. Put differ-
ently, federal prosecution as check on state underenforcement 
rests more directly on the initiative, diligence, and judgment of 
federal prosecutors than private victims. In some areas, federal 
commitment is significant.145 But it also varies with the policy 
priorities of presidential administrations, which can vary consid-
erably in their commitment to fighting certain kinds of crimes 
and to federal oversight of state criminal justice administra-
tion.146 
But that distinction has an upside: private prosecution and 
judicial review do not work in cases in which there is no direct 
victim—or in which private parties do not realize they have been 
victimized, as in some cases of large-scale corporate or govern-
ment fraud, or in some cases of child pornography.147 Federal 
prosecutors, however, take on just such cases as a core part of 
their enforcement agenda.148 On the other hand, federal over-
sight is limited in other important respects: federal criminal en-
forcement authority is not fully coextensive with state criminal 
law; notably, for example, it provides effectively no enforcement 
redundancy for ordinary domestic violence, rape, and other sex-
ual assault offenses.149 
 
 145. For an indication that federal enforcement policy is designed to protect 
specific victim interests, see U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FY 2014 ANNUAL PERFOR-
MANCE REPORT AND FY 2016 ANNUAL PERFORMANCE PLAN I-16–17 (2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/doj/pages/attachments/2015/02/06/ 
fy2014aprfy_2016app2.pdf (describing aspects of the “Vulnerable People Prior-
ity Goal”). 
 146. See Lichtblau, supra note 141. 
 147. See Paul G. Cassell & James R. Marsh, Full Restitution for Child Por-
nography Victims: The Supreme Court’s Paroline Decision and the Need for a 
Congressional Response, 13 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 7 (2015). 
 148. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 145, at II-22, I-33 (describing 
prioritization of federal prosecutions into financial or government fraud and 
child exploitation). 
 149. See Jane Kim, Taking Rape Seriously: Rape as Slavery, 35 HARV. J.L. 
& GENDER 263, 277–83 (2012) (criticizing inadequate federal criminalization of 
rape); Donald A. Dripps, Why Rape Should Be a Federal Crime 4 (2018), (un-
published manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
3095741. Without grounds for federal jurisdiction—such as conduct involving 
interstate travel or occurring on federal property—sexual assaults and other 
violent offenses are the exclusive province of state officials. Kim, supra, at 277. 
For examples of the limits built into federal offenses, see 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) 
(2016) (knowingly recruiting or enticing minors to engage in commercial sex 
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B. THREE KINDS OF OFFENSES: CORRUPTION, POLICE 
VIOLENCE, SEXUAL ASSAULT 
Consider the efficacy for these oversight options with re-
spect three types of offenses: local fraud or corruption, excessive 
use of force and other wrongdoing by local law enforcement offic-
ers, and sexual assaults. These three classes of offenses have in 
common that they have proven to be especially vulnerable to un-
derenforcement. At the same time, the differences in how U.S. 
criminal justice institutions have responded to underenforce-
ment in each area highlight the efficacy and limits of the feder-
alism-based enforcement redundancy compared to the alterna-
tives—both those U.S. jurisdictions reject (private prosecution 
and judicial review) and a fourth, unique strategy they embrace: 
politically accountable prosecutors. 
1. Public Corruption 
Corrupt conduct by government officials is a category of 
wrongdoing especially likely to suffer from underenforcement, 
for obvious reasons: we depend on one set of public officials, pros-
ecutors and investigative agents, to stop wrongdoing by other 
public officials—as well as by colleagues within their own ranks. 
Professional and even personal relationships often exist between 
these groups of public officials. Even when the boundaries be-
tween lawful and unlawful conduct are clear and law enforce-
ment can learn of misconduct done mostly in secret, political or 
personal incentives for enforcement officials that discourage 
zealous enforcement can exist for enforcement officials in the 
same jurisdiction—perhaps enmeshed in the same political net-
works. In short, underenforcement in this realm follows more 
from favoritism toward offenders than the biases against victim 
groups or types of offenses. 
“Corruption” is a notoriously hard concept to define,150 but 
that difficulty is actually somewhat useful for present purposes. 
Some of what constitutes public corruption is relatively clearly 
 
acts); 18 U.S.C. § 2423(b) (2016) (prohibiting travel in interstate commerce for 
purpose of engaging in illicit sexual conduct with minor females). 
 150. The scholarly literature on public corruption is considerable. For a short 
overview of the debate and the federal law, see David Mills & Robert Weisberg, 
Corrupting the Harm Requirement in White Collar Crime, 60 STAN. L. REV. 
1371, 1377–94 (2008). For longer treatments, see generally POLITICAL CORRUP-
TION: A HANDBOOK (Arnold J. Heidenheimer et al. eds., 2d ed. 1989) (compiling 
comparative scholarly work on political corruption); ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF 
POLITICAL CORRUPTION: A HANDBOOK (Paul M. Heywood ed., 2015) (focusing 
on international and comparative corruption issues). 
  
892 MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW [103:843 
 
defined in positive law. Easy cases involve straightforward prop-
erty theft or embezzlement, quid pro quo bribery, and extor-
tion.151 Statutes also make clear at least some cases of illegal 
gratuities and breaches of regulations that govern activities such 
as campaign finance.152 More ambiguous or marginal cases of al-
leged corruption, however, illustrate the federal government’s 
ambitious commitment to enforcing broad interpretations of fed-
eral anti-corruption laws to conduct of state and local officials. 
That enforcement track record demonstrates the strong commit-
ment to enforcement redundancy in this area. 
States have their own regulatory strategies to address gov-
ernment corruption, although independent assessments do not 
judge them to be particularly successful.153 The federal govern-
ment seems to share that view. The Justice Department created 
a Public Integrity Section within the Criminal Division in 
1976,154 and in the four decades since, federal prosecutors have 
 
 151. See, e.g., McDonnell v. United States, 136 S.Ct. 2355, 2365 (2016) (de-
scribing quid pro quo requirement for federal bribery offense, 18 U.S.C. § 201, 
in relation to extortion and honest-services fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a) 
& 1346, used to prosecute corruption by state officials); Skilling v. United 
States, 561 U.S. 358, 407–09 (2010) (clarifying quid pro quo requirements for 
bribery and kickback conduct in honest-services fraud prosecutions). 
 152. See 18 U.S.C. § 201 (2012) (criminalizing bribes and gratuities); 18 
U.S.C. § 666 (2012) (criminalizing theft or bribery related to federally funded 
programs); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343, 1346 (2016) (criminalizing mail, wire, and 
“honest services” fraud); 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (2012) (criminalizing extortion “under 
color of official right”). 
 153. See, e.g., Nicholas Kusnetz, Only Three States Score Higher Than D+ in 
State Integrity Investigation; 11 Flunk, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY, https://www 
.publicintegrity.org/2015/11/09/18693/only-three-states-score-higher-d-state 
-integrity-investigation-11-flunk (last updated Nov. 23, 2015) (scoring states 
and explaining methodology; all but three states scored a “D+” or below on A-
to-F scale); see also Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, TRANSPARENCY INT’L 
(Jan. 25, 2017), https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption_ 
perceptions_index_2016#table (ranking 174 countries by corruption scores; the 
United States ranked eighteenth). On the challenges facing corruption 
measures, see generally Staffan Andersson, Beyond Unidimensional Measure-
ment of Corruption, 19 PUB. INTEGRITY 58 (2017) (analyzing the challenges 
posed by treating corruption as a one-dimensional phenomenon); Adriana S. 
Cordis & Jeffrey Milyo, Measuring Public Corruption in the United States: Evi-
dence From Administrative Records of Federal Prosecutions, 18 PUB. INTEGRITY 
127 (2016) (criticizing the use of federal convictions data in public corruption 
analysis and advocating instead for the use of administrative data). For a list of 
state criminal laws and ethical rules governing corruption, see Penalties for Vi-
olations of State Ethics and Public Corruption Laws, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLA-
TURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/ethics/50-state-chart-criminal-penalties 
-for-public-corr.aspx (last updated Sept. 10, 2018). 
 154. PUB. INTEGRITY SECTION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT TO CON-
GRESS ON THE ACTIVITIES AND OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC INTEGRITY SECTION 
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aggressively prosecuted conduct of state and local officials that 
it determines breaches federal anti-corruption statutes.155 For 
the past two decades, federal anti-corruption prosecutions of 
state and local officials typically average 350–400 per year.156 
Combatting “public corruption” is a top priority for the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation, on par with combating threats of ter-
rorism, foreign espionage, and cyber-warfare.157 And many of 
these prosecutions targeted wrongdoing far removed from prop-
erty theft or quid pro quo bribery.158 They extend to conduct in-
volving undue influence, breaches of fiduciary duty, or failure to 
provide citizens with “honest services”159—wrongdoing for which 
the public harm is sometimes hard to identify.160 
 
FOR 2015, at i (2015), https://www.justice.gov/criminal/file/891961/download. 
 155. See, e.g., id. at 17–19 (providing examples of the Justice Department’s 
prosecution of state and local officials). 
 156. Id. at 23–24 tbl.2 (tracking the number of convictions of corrupt public 
officials during 1996–2015); id. at 25–28, tbl.3 (tracking public corruptions pros-
ecutions by federal district during 2006–2015); Patricia Salkin & Bailey Ince, 
It’s a “Criming Shame”: Moving from Land Use Ethics to Criminalization of Be-
havior Leading to Permits and Other Zoning Related Acts, 46 URB. LAW. 249, 
250 (2014) (describing federal prosecution of state and local officials). 
 157. FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE FBI 
STORY: 2017, at 11 (2017), https://www.fbi.gov/file-repository/the-fbi-story-2017 
.pdf/view (describing public corruption as a “key responsibilit[y]”). 
 158. See, e.g., id. at 10–20 (providing specific examples of federal public cor-
ruption prosecution for various types of conduct). 
 159. Id. 
 160. United States v. Alfisi, 308 F.3d 144, 155–56 (2d Cir. 2002) (Sack, J., 
dissenting) (arguing that payments to federal officials prosecuted under 18 
U.S.C. § 201 caused no clear harm or “corruption”); Mills & Weisberg, supra 
note 150, at 1373–74 (discussing the role of fiduciary duties in criminal liabil-
ity); id. at 1377, 1386–90, 1404–05 (discussing uncertainty of “harm” in some 
contexts); id. at 1395–1400 (discussing honest services); Lex Hemphill, Acquit-
tals End Bid Scandal that Dogged Winter Games, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2003, at 
D1 (reporting a federal district judge’s criticism of the prosecution, saying “in 
his 40 years of working in the criminal justice system, he had never seen a case 
so devoid of ‘criminal intent or evil purpose’”). 
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By some accounts, including the U.S. Supreme Court’s on 
occasion,161 this enforcement agenda has been overly aggres-
sive.162 But Congress has generally encouraged far-reaching fed-
eral enforcement, notably by expanding the scope of federal anti-
corruption law in response to narrow judicial interpretation.163 
And the key point here is that the federal executive branch is 
firmly committed to a robust enforcement policy against local 
government corruption that is also criminalized under state law, 
and Congress has supported this agenda by enacting federal 
crimes intended to duplicate, or greatly overlap, state of-
fenses.164 In fact, federal statutes used in anti-corruption cases—
 
 161. For Supreme Court decisions rejecting broad applications of federal 
anti-corruption statutes, see generally McDonnell v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 
2355 (2016) (reversing the former Virginia Governor’s conviction for honest-ser-
vices fraud and extortion); McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350 (1987) (re-
versing the conviction of state officials and holding that federal mail fraud stat-
ute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, does not apply to schemes to defraud state citizens of the 
intangible “right to have the Commonwealth’s affairs conducted honestly”). As 
a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court requires a “clear statement” that 
Congress intends a federal criminal statute to duplicate a state crime and 
thereby “effect a significant change in the sensitive relation between federal and 
state criminal jurisdiction.” United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349–50 (1971); 
see also Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 811–12 (1971). But Congress has 
made such intent sufficiently clear for the Court in numerous statutes, includ-
ing those at issue in Bass (18 U.S.C. § 1202(a), now codified at 18 U.S.C. 
§ 922(g)) and in Rewis (18 U.S.C. § 1952). See, e.g., Perrin v. United States, 444 
U.S. 37, 50 (1979) (finding that § 1952 reflects congressional intent “to alter the 
federal-state balance in order to reinforce state law enforcement”). 
 162. See, e.g., Roderick M. Hills, Jr., Corruption and Federalism: (When) Do 
Federal Criminal Prosecutions Improve Non-Federal Democracy?, 6 THEORETI-
CAL INQUIRIES L. 113, 137–44 (2005) (arguing that federal enforcement of public 
corruption in local governments harms local styles of democracy); Harvey A. 
Silverglate & Emma Quinn-Judge, Tawdry or Corrupt? McDonnell Fails to 
Draw a Clear Line for Federal Prosecution of State Officials, 2016 CATO SUP. 
CT. REV. 189, 213–19 (2016) (arguing that the honest services statute is too 
vague to be fairly enforced); cf. John C. Coffee, Jr., Modern Mail Fraud: The 
Restoration of the Public/Private Distinction, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 427, 430–31 
(1998) (arguing that federal prosecutors rely on broad federal common law 
crimes in fraud cases against state and local public officials); Salkin & Ince, 
supra note 156, at 266–67 (describing aggressive federal enforcement of public 
corruption in the context of land use). But see Mark S. Gaioni, Federal Anticor-
ruption Law in the State and Local Context: Defining the Scope of 18 U.S.C. 
§ 666, 46 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 207, 237–45 (2012) (arguing for broad in-
terpretation of § 666 to cover state and local officials). 
 163. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1346 (2012) (criminalizing “honest services” fraud). 
The statute was enacted in 1988 in response to the Supreme Court’s 1987 deci-
sion in United States v. McNally, which held that 18 U.S.C. § 1341 did not cover 
“honest services” fraud. Gaioni, supra note 162, at 243 n.192. 
 164. See, e.g., Perrin, 444 U.S. at 50 (finding that section 1952 reflects con-
gressional intent “to alter the federal-state balance in order to reinforce state 
law enforcement”). 
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like other federal criminal statutes—rely on and incorporate 
state law in federal offense definitions. In light of this structure, 
federal prosecutions can claim to effectuate state law goals—an 
especially straightforward version of federalism-based enforce-
ment redundancy.165 
2. Sexual Assault 
In sharp contrast to public corruption, enforcement redun-
dancy through coextensive jurisdiction is largely nonexistent for 
a large portion of the serious crimes that dominate state felony 
dockets, including sexual assaults, domestic violence, and homi-
cide.166 Federal law reaches only a small number of these of-
fenses when they intersect a special basis for federal jurisdiction, 
such as interstate conduct—like human trafficking—or wrongs 
that occur on federal property or involve federal employees.167 
For most kinds of homicides, the lack of redundancy is only a 
modest hindrance to adequate enforcement; holding aside dis-
tinctive exceptions—such as homicides by police or racially mo-
tivated lynchings—there is little evidence to suggest patterns of 
homicide underenforcement in state justice systems.168 Domestic 
violence and sexual assaults are a different story. Like local pub-
lic corruption, sexual assaults have long been a key example of 
 
 165. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (2012) (prohibiting interstate travel for “un-
lawful activity,” which can be made unlawful by state law); Perrin, 444 U.S. at 
50 (“In defining ‘unlawful activity’ [in 18 U.S.C. § 1952], Congress has clearly 
stated its intention to include violations of state as well as federal bribery law.”); 
United States v. Welch, 327 F.3d 1081, 1092–1103 (10th Cir. 2003) (reinstating 
an indictment and holding that Utah law serves as predicate to define violations 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1952). 
 166. See Kim, supra note 149; Dripps, supra note 149, at 3 (noting that sex-
ual assaults in federal law are confined to very limited contexts, such as human 
trafficking). 
 167. See Kim, supra note 149. 
 168. See Lynching in America: Confronting the Legacy of Racial Terror, 
EQUAL JUST. INITIATIVE, https://lynchinginamerica.eji.org/report (last visited 
Oct. 30, 2018) (“[O]f all lynchings committed after 1900, only 1 percent resulted 
in a lyncher being convicted of a criminal offense” (citing PAULA J. GIDDINGS, 
IDA: A SWORD AMONG LIONS 473–74 (2008))). Data on prosecutorial charging 
decisions is harder to come by, but clearance rates for homicides—meaning the 
percentage of cases police resolve, usually by arrest—are higher for homicides 
than other offense categories. See 2016 Crime in the United States, FBI: UCR, 
https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2016/crime-in-the-u.s.-2016/tables/table-17 
(last visited Oct. 30, 2018) (reporting that the 2016 national clearance rate for 
homicides was 59.4%, compared to 45.6% for all violent crime and 18.3% for 
property crimes). 
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serious wrongdoing to which the responses of state and local 
criminal justice agencies have been deeply problematic.169 
Underenforcement is hard to measure for sexual assaults as 
it is in other contexts, but central features of the problem are 
clear enough. Rape and other forms of sexual assault are dra-
matically underreported crimes.170 The leading government ef-
fort to collect data on sexual assaults (and other crimes), the Na-
tional Crime Victimization Survey, is widely thought to 
undercount incidents of those offenses.171 And rates of victim re-
ports to police departments are even lower. The FBI Uniform 
Crime Reports collects data on sexual assaults reported to local 
police agencies; the number is consistently well below the annual 
number reported in the National Crime Victimization Survey.172 
One reason that victims do not to report rapes to law en-
forcement is the perception that police and prosecutors (as well 
as juries) are unduly skeptical of rape allegations.173 And there 
is good evidence that law enforcement agencies’ responses to sex-
ual assault reports are ineffective. Police clearance-by-arrest 
rates are low.174 Detailed studies of how police departments han-
dle reported sexual assault cases find “substantial attrition,” 
 
 169. See S. REP. NO. 103–138, at 42 (1994) (“Police may refuse to take reports 
[of crimes against women]; prosecutors may encourage defendants to plead to 
minor offenses . . . . At every step of the way, the criminal justice system poses 
significant hurdles for victims.”); Catharine A. MacKinnon, Rape Redefined, 10 
HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 431, 439 (2016) (“One out of about ten acts of rape or 
attempted rape that fit basic legal definitions in the United States is reported 
to authorities. Dramatically fewer [reported cases] are prosecuted or result in 
convictions . . . .”). For detailed examination of prosecutor decision-making on 
sexual assault complaints in three jurisdictions, see CASSIA C. SPOHN ET AL., 
NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE REFERENCE SERV., PROSECUTORS’ CHARGING DECI-
SIONS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT CASES: A MULTI-SITE STUDY 85–88 (2001), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/197048.pdf. 
 170. See Dripps, supra note 149, at 6 & n.25 (noting a National Violence 
Against Women survey by the Centers for Disease Control found twice as many 
rapes as the NCVS survey reported for the same year). See generally CANDACE 
KRUTTSCHNITT ET AL., ESTIMATING THE INCIDENCE OF RAPE AND SEXUAL AS-
SAULT (2014) (describing the reasons why it is “highly likely” that the National 
Crime Victimization Survey, conducted by the Bureau of Justice Statistics, un-
derestimates rapes and other sexual assaults). 
 171. KRUTTSCHNITT ET AL., supra note 170; Dripps, supra note 149. 
 172. Dripps, supra note 149, at 9 (summarizing and comparing Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports and National Crime Victimization 
Survey data). 
 173. See supra note 169 and accompanying text. 
 174. Dripps, supra note 149, at 13–15 (summarizing clearance-rate data 
from Federal Bureau of Investigation Uniform Crime Reports and from the Los 
Angeles County Sheriff ’s Department). 
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typically at the point when police decide whether to make an ar-
rest.175 In the Los Angeles Police Department, only one report in 
nine was cleared by arrest; one in ten resulted in prosecution.176 
One hurdle lies in forensic evidence development: law enforce-
ment agencies nationwide have suffered long backlogs in testing 
rape evidence kits,177 although federal funding has recently 
helped reduce that problem.178 
Notoriously, things used to be much worse. Under the com-
mon law definition, rape convictions required proof that the of-
fender used force to overcome the victim’s “utmost resistance.”179 
Evidence of women’s—and only women’s—prior sexual conduct 
or reputation for “unchastity” was a permissible basis on which 
to infer consent.180 The law excluded rape of one’s spouse from 
 
 175. See, e.g., CASSIA SPOHN & KATHARINE TELLIS, NAT’L CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
REFERENCE SERV., POLICING AND PROSECUTING SEXUAL ASSAULT IN LOS AN-
GELES CITY AND COUNTY VII (2012), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/ 
237582.pdf. 
 176. Id. at VII–VIII, 8. Data on clearance rates is itself suspect; departments 
sometimes do not disclose all reports of sexual assaults they receive. Id. at IV 
(finding that the L.A. Police Department and the L.A. Sheriff ’s Department 
both substantially exaggerated their clearance rates). 
 177. Rape Kit Backlogs: Failing the Test of Providing Justice to Sexual As-
sault Survivors: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and Home-
land Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 21 (2010) (statement 
of Rep. Anthony Weiner, Member, H. Comm. on the Judiciary) (noting that 
there are over 542,000 untested rape kits); Caitlin Dickson, How the U.S. Ended 
Up With 400,000 Untested Rape Kits, DAILY BEAST (Sept. 23, 2014), https://www 
.thedailybeast.com/how-the-us-ended-up-with-400000-untested-rape-kits; Day-
ton Uttinger, Why Is There Still a Rape Kit Backlog?, WOMEN’S MEDIA CTR. 
(Aug. 1, 2017), http://www.womensmediacenter.com/fbomb/why-is-there-still-a-
rape-kit-backlog (“There are an estimated 175,000 untested rape kits . . . across 
the US . . . .”). 
 178. See OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, 
SEXUAL ASSAULT KIT TESTING INITIATIVES AND NON-INVESTIGATIVE KITS 3 
(2017), https://www.justice.gov/ovw/page/file/931391/download (noting that 
$100 million was awarded to states and localities in 2014–16 to reduce rape kit 
backlog). 
 179. Note, Recent Statutory Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape, 
61 VA. L. REV. 1500, 1505–07 (1975). 
 180. See, e.g., State v. Sibley, 33 S.W. 167, 171 (Mo. 1895) (“[T]he rule in this 
state permitting a witness to be impeached by proof of general reputation for 
unchastity is confined to females.”); People v. Abbot, 19 Wend. 192, 194 (N.Y. 
1838) (permitting questions to the rape complainant about her past sexual con-
duct because in rape prosecutions “the material issue is on the willingness or 
reluctance of the prosecutrix—an act of the mind”). 
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the offense definition.181 Prosecutors and police were openly 
skeptical of rape accusations and reluctant to investigate.182 
Yet much of this legal infrastructure intended to restrict 
rape law enforcement has been abolished. Rape offenses have 
been revised to eliminate resistance requirements, and many 
states also removed the requirement to prove use of force.183 Ev-
idence rules are now more favorable to sexual assault complain-
ants: rape shield laws in all jurisdictions prohibit use of a com-
plainant’s past sexual behavior as character evidence or a basis 
on which to infer consent,184 while evidence rules in federal 
courts and nineteen states permit evidence of the defendant’s 
past sexual offenses to show propensity to commit sexual as-
saults.185 Some police departments have officers specially 
trained in sexual assault investigations, and prosecutors’ offices 
(as required by statute in some states) have specially trained 
units dedicated to sexual assault prosecutions.186 Hospitals and 
 
 181. SUSAN ESTRICH, REAL RAPE 8 (1987). 
 182. See id. at 8–22 (describing traditional rape definitions, spousal excep-
tion, evidentiary rules, and police responses to rape reports); Recent Statutory 
Developments in the Definition of Forcible Rape, supra note 179, at 1505–07 
(describing the “utmost resistance” requirement); see also State v. Terry, 215 
A.2d 374, 376 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1965) (affirming that, to prove liability 
for rape, “it must be shown that [the victim] did, in fact, resist the assault”). 
 183. Kathleen F. Cairney, Addressing Acquaintance Rape: The New Direc-
tion of the Rape Law Reform Movement, 69 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 291, 298–99 
(2012). 
 184. See FED. R. EVID. 412; Leah DaSilva, The Next Generation of Sexual 
Conduct: Expanding the Protective Reach of Rape Shield Laws to Include Evi-
dence Found on Myspace, 13 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 211, 219 (2008) 
(“In 1974, Michigan became the first jurisdiction to enact a rape shield law. The 
federal government and remaining forty nine states followed, most within sev-
eral years.”); cf. Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Constitutionality of “Rape Shield” 
Statute Restricting Use of Evidence of Victim’s Sexual Experiences, 1 A.L.R. 4th 
283 (2018) (discussing constitutional limits on rape shield rules). 
 185. See FED. R. EVID. 413, 414. 
 186. See, e.g., CYRUS R. VANCE, JR., N.Y. CTY. DIST. ATTORNEY’S OFFICE, 
SEXUAL ASSAULT AND THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (2010), http:// 
manhattanda.org/sites/default/files/Sex_Crimes.pdf [https://web.archive.org/ 
web/20170702150412/http://manhattanda.org/sites/default/files/Sex_Crimes 
.pdf ]  (describing the “Sex Crimes Prosecution Unit” and special units for sexual 
assaults crime and victims in hospitals police precincts, and social service agen-
cies). See generally Jennifer G. Long & John Wilkinson, The Benefits of Special-
ized Prosecution Units in Domestic and Sexual Violence Cases, ÆQUITAS: STRAT-
EGIES BRIEF, Dec. 2011, at 1, 1 (describing how experienced prosecutors improve 
handling of domestic and sexual violence cases). 
Similar strategies of offense reform and creation of dedicated prosecution 
units have more recently been strategies against another context of endemic 
underenforcement—crimes against inmates. See Alysia Santo, Preying on Pris-
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social service agencies likewise now have staff trained in forensic 
interviewing and evidence-gathering in the course of aiding as-
sault victims.187 
This basic overview—drawn from a substantial scholarly lit-
erature—paints a somewhat contradictory picture. On the one 
hand, the primary story is one of longstanding underenforce-
ment—a combination of explicit legal policies, practical evi-
dence-gathering and proof challenges, and cultural biases re-
sulted in a notoriously weak response to sexual assaults by state 
criminal justice systems. On the other hand, there is a story, over 
the last forty years or so, of wide-ranging success in achieving 
reforms on several fronts—substantive and procedural law, in-
stitutional design, and resource allocation—designed to improve 
enforcement capacity. In other words, U.S. jurisdictions made 
substantial progress against an ingrained tradition of underen-
forcement without turning to any model of enforcement redun-
dancy—federalization, private prosecution, or judicial review. 
That is more than state justice systems were ever able to do with 
regard to local government corruption, where the remedy in-
stead was the rise of federal criminal law enforcement. 
And yet, few seem to consider this reform story a success.188 
The data on underreporting by victims, low arrest rates by po-
lice, and charging rates by prosecutors (along with the rape kit 
 
oners: In Texas, Staffers Rarely Go to Jail for Sexually Abusing Inmates, MAR-
SHALL PROJECT (June 7, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/06/17/ 
preying-on-prisoners (describing a special prosecution unit in Texas focused on 
crimes against inmates, and noting that between 1990 and 2006, the number of 
states with statutes that expressly criminalize sexual abuse of inmates rose 
from eighteen to fifty, and prosecution rates rose from thirty-seven to forty-nine 
percent of staff sexual misconduct case referrals). 
 187. See State v. Stahl, 855 N.E.2d 834, 836 (Ohio 2006) (describing the “De-
veloping Options for Violent Emergencies (DOVE) unit” in a hospital designed 
to gather evidence from and provide care to sexual assault victims); History of 
the Movement, WASH. COALITION SEXUAL ASSAULT PROGRAMS, http://www 
.wcsap.org/history-movement (last updated May 9, 2016) (describing the estab-
lishment of the first rape crisis centers in 1972). See generally OFFICE VIOLENCE 
AGAINST WOMEN, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, A NATIONAL PROTOCOL FOR SEXUAL 
ASSAULT MEDICAL FORENSIC EXAMINATIONS: ADULTS/ADOLESCENTS (2013), 
https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/ovw/241903.pdf (describing recommendations, 
techniques, and strategies for health care providers to maximize forensic evi-
dence gathering during provision of medical care). 
 188. CASSIA SPOHN & JULIE HORNEY, RAPE LAW REFORM: A GRASSROOTS 
REVOLUTION AND ITS IMPACT 77 (1992) (describing expectations that legal re-
forms would improve prosecution rates); id. at 100 (“[L]egal changes did not 
produce the dramatic results that were anticipated by reformers. The reforms 
had no impact in most of the jurisdictions.”). 
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testing backlog) make it easy to view state criminal justice sys-
tems as failing to achieve adequate enforcement responses to 
sexual assaults despite the scope and gravity of the problem—
124,000 offenses reported to police in 2015, and 431,000 assault 
reports estimated by the National Crime Victim Survey.189 
This story of reform, its decidedly limited success, and the 
responses to that record all reveal insights about the prospects 
for redressing underenforcement through redundancy in this 
context. Intersecting feminist, victim rights, and rape-law-re-
form movements have achieved some remarkable reforms 
through the political process over the last four decades. U.S. 
criminal justice, like U.S. public law generally, is responsive to 
popular sentiment, well-organized reform movements, and in-
terest groups.190 But these movements never sought any mecha-
nism of enforcement redundancy, and federal and state lawmak-
ers never seriously considered one. Even now, when offense 
definitions, victim rights, evidentiary rules, and organizational 
changes in law enforcement agencies offer few plausible options 
for further improvement, there is effectively no sign of interest 
in private prosecution and judicial or administrative oversight. 
Instead, the sole focus of further innovation to address endemic 
underenforcement of sexual assault offenses is the federal gov-
ernment. And most federal policy—and policy proposals—stop 
short of expanding federal law to cover sexual assaults now 
within the jurisdiction solely of state courts.191 A notable excep-
tion is Professor Donald Dripps’s current proposal to expand fed-
eral criminal law to cover most sexual assault offenses—pre-
cisely the model of federal-state enforcement redundancy that 
 
 189. JENNIFER L. TRUMAN & RACHEL E. MORGAN, BUREAU JUSTICE STATIS-
TICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION, 2015, at 2 tbl.1 (2016), 
https://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cv15.pdf (reporting that the National 
Crime Victimization Survey estimated 431,840 rapes/sexual assaults in 2015); 
Crime in the United States by Volume and Rate Per 100,000 Inhabitants, 1996 
–2015, FED. BUREAU INVESTIGATION, https://ucr.fbi.gov/crime-in-the-u.s/2015/ 
crime-in-the-u.s.-2015/tables/table-1 (last visited Oct. 30, 2018) (reporting 
124,047 rape reports under the “revised definition”). 
 190. Cf. Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Principles, Practices, and Social 
Movements, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 927, 946–50 (2006) (arguing that social move-
ments significantly shape the application of constitutional principles); Reva B. 
Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social Movement 
Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 279, 328–44 (2001) (arguing that the history of 
the Nineteenth Amendment and the Equal Rights Amendment show that the 
U.S. Constitution is amenable to contestation by social movements). 
 191. Violence Against Women Act of 1994, Pub. L. 103–322 (1994) (codified 
at 34 U.S.C. §§ 12291–12511) (2017) (establishing a broad set of policies directed 
at violence against women that creates no federal criminal offenses). 
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exists now for drug crimes, corruption, police violence, and much 
else.192 But otherwise, existing policies and reform proposals em-
phasize more modest, although meaningful, federal efforts to im-
prove state justice administration through, for example, funding 
grants (as for rape kit testing)193 and occasionally by litigation 
to force institutional reforms in local agencies. 
In fact, federal law empowers the U.S. Justice Department 
to sue local police departments and other agencies, and author-
izes structural injunctions to remedy systemic misconduct.194 
But the Department’s use of this authority has largely focused 
on police violence rather than sexual assault underenforce-
ment.195 Various local law enforcement agencies have entered 
consent decrees under which they adopt institutional and policy 
reforms to reduce patterns of misconduct, even though federal 
intervention is hampered by the paucity of data on police mis-
conduct, limited federal resources, and at times the political com-
mitment of the presidential administration.196 More to the point 
here, in only a few cases have federal officials targeted local 
agencies’ inadequate responses to sexual assault.197 
In sum, and in sharp contrast to public corruption, the prob-
lem of underenforcement in the sexual assault context reveals 
the resistance, and cost, of U.S. criminal justice to institutional 
structures of enforcement redundancy. Having ruled out judicial 
review and private prosecution from the imaginations of reform-
movement activists, the only alternative is the one that U.S. 
criminal justice always favors—federalism. Where federal crim-
inal law takes on an enforcement agenda, it is usually effec-
tive.198 Where tradition, politics, jurisdictional limits, or policy 
 
 192. Dripps, supra note 149, at 46–49, app. I. For an earlier proposal along 
the same lines, see Kim, supra note 149, at 304–09. 
 193. E.g., OFFICE ON VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN, supra note 178 and accom-
panying text. 
 194. The statutory authority is 42 U.S.C. § 14141 (2016). 
 195. See Harmon, Policing Reform, supra note 21 (discussing structural re-
form aimed at police violence without noting any instances of targeting sexual 
assault offenses). 
 196. Leading observers view this structural reform as insufficient to address 
the scope of the police-misconduct problems. See id. at 59–61 (describing injunc-
tive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 14141, noting limits on data about police miscon-
duct, and explaining how insufficient data limits the effectiveness of reform ef-
forts). On the prospect of reduced federal commitment to this strategy in the 
Trump administration, see U.S. ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 24; Horwitz et al., 
supra note 24. 
 197. See Dripps, supra note 149, at 19 & n.100 (citing five federal actions 
under § 14141 addressing local agencies’ responses to sexual assault crimes). 
 198. That is, federal criminal law is effective at successful prosecutions, if 
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choices restrict the reach of federal law, as with sexual assault, 
the U.S. justice system is largely out of options. States were will-
ing to change substantive and procedural law in hopes of improv-
ing rape prosecutions, but not to infringe prosecutors’ monopoly 
control of charging by expanding modes of judicial, administra-
tive, or private-party oversight. 
3. Police Violence 
Responses to unjustified police violence reveal a third out-
come for enforcement redundancy confined to the federalism 
model. Federal enforcement authority extends to cases of police 
violence to a much greater degree than for sexual assaults. That 
authority extends as well to other kinds of bias-motivated 
wrongdoing by both private actors and government officials, 
which local police and prosecutors have at times ignored or de-
valued, and for which state-level enforcement commitment con-
tinues to be uneven.199 Federal jurisdiction is coextensive with 
state jurisdiction regarding police wrongdoing, and the Justice 
Department’s institutional capacity for enforcement probably 
exceeds that of its state counterparts, but in one respect the over-
lap is not complete. The key substantive criminal offenses avail-
able to prosecutors in the federal code are somewhat more re-
strictive. The primary federal statute used to charge cases of 
 
not at reducing the underlying social problem targeted by criminal law. See gen-
erally, e.g., STEVEN B. DUKE & ALBERT C. GROSS, AMERICA’S LONGEST WAR: RE-
THINKING OUR TRAGIC CRUSADE AGAINST DRUGS (1993) (examining and cri-
tiquing American drug policies). 
 199. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 241 (2012) (criminalizing conspiracy); id. § 242 
(criminalizing willful deprivation of federal rights while acting under color of 
law); id. § 249 (criminalizing willful bodily injury because of victim’s race, reli-
gion, sexual orientation, or gender identity). Federal prosecutors focus on other 
serious direct-victim crimes as well, such as human trafficking and child por-
nography. See U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, supra note 145 (describing prioritization 
of such cases). But federal involvement in that realm is presumably motivated 
not so much by a need for oversight of untrustworthy state prosecutors as by 
the greater resources, expertise, and interstate jurisdictional advantages that 
federal prosecutors bring to such cases. 
Criminal prosecution is only one aspect of federal policies to reduce custo-
dial deaths and improper uses of force by police. Other strategies include inves-
tigating abuse and corruption in local police agencies and using civil injunctive 
remedies against those agencies to change patterns of wrongdoing, as well as 
gathering data on custodial deaths and police uses of force. See Harmon, Polic-
ing Reform, supra note 21; Simone Weichselbaum, Policing the Police: As the 
Justice Department Pushes Reform, Some Changes Don’t Last, MARSHALL PRO-
JECT (May 26, 2015), https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/23/policing 
-the-police (describing the difficulties in achieving lasting reforms in local police 
departments through federal consent decrees). 
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police excessive use of force requires proof of willful deprivation 
of rights,200 a strict mens rea standard that makes it harder for 
federal prosecutors to prove liability than it would be for state 
prosecutors relying on typical assault or homicide offense defini-
tions.201 The fact that Congress has for decades let stand this 
mens rea hurdle to excessive-force prosecutions suggests that 
federal legislators, if not Justice Department officials, are less 
committed to a full federal-state enforcement redundancy—or 
“to alter[ing] the federal-state balance in order to reinforce state 
law enforcement”—than they are for public corruption of-
fenses.202 
That limit notwithstanding, federal prosecutions in this 
area have a track record of succeeding where state prosecutions 
failed or were never attempted, and in that way providing at 
least a partial remedy for underenforcement by state criminal 
justice officials. Much of the federal advantage comes from the 
fact that federal prosecutors are, in general, better situated to 
objectively investigate, assess, and prosecute wrongdoing by po-
lice officers than are local prosecutors who ordinarily interact 
with and depend upon those officers (or at least their agencies). 
This is not a particular criticism of local prosecutors’ offices; it is 
one instance of the basic problem that officials (and people gen-
erally) are untrustworthy judges of the conduct of others with 
whom they have affiliations, allegiances, or ongoing relation-
ships. For that reason a few states assign such cases to state-
level, rather than local, officials.203 And the U.S. Justice Depart-
ment attempts to collect data on deaths in jails, prison, or during 
 
 200. See 18 U.S.C. § 242 (liability for an official who “willfully subjects any 
person . . . to the deprivation of any [federal] rights”); United States v. Screws, 
325 U.S. 91, 103 (1945) (interpreting § 242’s willfulness term to require “specific 
intent to deprive a person of a federal right”). 
 201. The prosecution of South Carolina police officer Michael Slager provides 
an example. State prosecutors charged Slager with murder; federal prosecutors 
charged him with criminal violation of civil rights under 18 U.S.C. § 242. For 
an example of this contrast between state and federal charges for the same of-
fense, see Blinder, supra note 52; Michael S. Schmidt & Matt Apuzzo, Officer Is 
Charged with Murder of a Black Man Shot in the Back, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 8, 
2015, at A1. 
 202. See Perrin v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 50 (1979) (broadly interpreting 
“bribery” in 18 U.S.C. § 1952 to include bribery of private individuals); supra 
Part III.B.1 and note 161 (citing Perrin in discussion of anti-corruption prose-
cutions under 18 U.S.C. § 1952). 
 203. See, e.g., WIS. STAT. §§ 175.47, 950.04(1v)(do), 950.08(2g)(h) (2014) (cod-
ifying Wis. Act 348 (2013)) (requiring investigations of “officer-involved deaths” 
to be conducted by investigators from a different agency). 
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attempted arrests, to facilitate Justice Department oversight.204 
The same concerns motivate English laws applying special judi-
cial scrutiny (when triggered by requests from victims’ families) 
to prosecutor’s decisions not to charge in the case of death caused 
by law enforcement officials or occurring in official custody.205 
U.S. victims lack a right to challenge noncharging decisions 
in cases of homicides by police. But they, along with organized 
interest groups, can lobby prosecutors to prosecute. In some cit-
ies, voters and activist groups have pressured local prosecutors 
on police violence cases.206 It is difficult to assess what role public 
sentiment plays (and should play) in charging decisions. But it 
is not hard to find instances of potent political challenges to non-
prosecution of police officers in the wake of fatal shootings. Chief 
prosecutors in Cleveland, Ohio, and Chicago, Illinois, lost reelec-
tion bids in the wake controversial failures to charge police offic-
ers in fatal-shooting cases.207 In the midst of popular and activist 
attention on such cases, prosecutors in several other cities have 
charged officers for offenses related to suspects’ deaths, with 
mixed records of success.208 Chicago prosecutors did so a year 
 
 204. See Data Collection: Mortality in Correctional Institutes (MCI) (For-
merly Deaths in Custody Reporting Program (DCRP)), BUREAU JUST. STAT., 
https://www.bjs.gov/index.cfm?ty=dcdetail&iid=243 (last visited Oct. 30, 2018) 
(providing data collection since 2000 for jails, since 2001 for prisons, and since 
2003 during arrests). The Death in Custody Reporting Act of 2000, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 13704 (2006), required local agencies to report deaths until it lapsed in 2006. 
Hunter Schwartz, Congress Decides to Get Serious About Tracking Police Shoot-
ings, WASH. POST (Dec. 11, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/ 
post-politics/wp/2014/12/11/congress-decides-to-get-serious-about-tracking 
-police-shootings. It was renewed in 2014. Death in Custody Act of 2013, Pub. 
L. 113-242, 128 Stat. 2860 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 
U.S.C). In the interim years, the Bureau collected data voluntarily reported by 
local agencies. Pete Kasperowicz, House Bill Would Require States to Report on 
Prisoner Deaths, HILL (Dec. 6, 2013), https://thehill.com/blogs/floor-action/ 
government-oversight/192354-house-to-require-states-to-report-on-prisoner 
-deaths. 
 205. See supra note 113. 
 206. E.g., Ed Krayewski, Prosecutors in Chicago, Cleveland Lose Re-Election 
Bids After Police Abuse Controversies, REASON (Mar. 16, 2016), http://reason 
.com/blog/2016/03/16/prosecutors-in-chicago-cleveland-lose-re. 
 207. Id.; see also Justin Glawe, Anita Alvarez, Chicago’s Top Prosecutor, 
Cleared Killer Cops 68 Times, DAILY BEAST (Mar. 14, 2016), http://www 
.thedailybeast.com/articles/2016/03/14/anita-alvarez-chicago-s-top-prosecutor 
-cleared-killer-cops-68-times.html. 
 208. See Manslaughter Conviction for Ex-Officer, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2016, 
at A15; Richard Perez-Pena, Officer Indicted in Shooting Death of Unarmed 
Man, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2015, at A1; Mark Berman, Minn. Officer Acquitted 
in Shooting of Philando Castile During Traffic Stop, Dismissed From Police 
Force, WASH. POST (June 17, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post 
  
2018] CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT REDUNDANCY 905 
 
after police fatally shot a suspect and only upon public release of 
video of the incident209—a scenario that suggests public atten-
tion corrected a noncharging decision influenced by improper 
considerations. 
However, U.S. localities vary widely in their demographics, 
politics, and community sentiments toward these cases.210 That 
variation, plus local election of prosecutors, contributes to widely 
varying enforcement policies across prosecution offices.211 And it 
means victims who urge prosecutions when local majority senti-
ment disfavors it have lower odds of successfully influencing 
 
-nation/wp/2017/06/16/minn-officer-acquitted-of-manslaughter-for-shooting 
-philando-castile-during-traffic-stop; Chris Dixon, Ex-Officer Seeks Bond in 
Shooting Death of Walter Scott, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 11, 2015), https://www. 
nytimes.com/2015/09/12/us/officer-seeks-bond-in-shooting-death-of-walter 
-scott.html (stating that officer was charged with murder); Wil S. Hylton, Bal-
timore vs. Marilyn Mosby, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Sept. 28, 2016), https://www.ny-
times.com/2016/10/02/magazine/marilyn-mosby-freddie-gray-baltimore.html 
(describing the failure to convict any of six officers indicted for the April 2015 
death of Freddie Gray); Justin Juozapavicius, Tulsa Officer Acquitted In Man’s 
Shooting Death Is Returning To The Police Force, ASSOCIATED PRESS (May 19, 
2017), https://www.apnews.com/9af40bcdbbd84f6e95fb3a430d4016c0. 
 209. Monica Davey & Mitch Smith, Justice Department Is Expected to Inves-
tigate Chicago Police, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 7, 2015, at A10 (reporting on the Justice 
Department’s investigation into the patterns and practices of the Chicago Police 
Department in the wake of Laquan McDonald shooting); Mitch Smith, Chicago 
Officer Pleads Not Guilty to Charge of Murder in Death of a Teenager, N.Y. 
TIMES, Dec. 30, 2015, at A12 (stating that a police officer was charged for the 
2014 fatal shooting of a teenager just before video footage of the incident was 
released). 
 210. For one notable political response, see LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 14:107.2(A), 
(E) (2018) (creating the “Blue Lives Matter” law); Kevin Conlon, Louisiana Gov-
ernor Signs ‘Blue Lives Matter’ Bill, CNN (May 27, 2016), https://www.cnn.com/ 
2016/05/26/us/louisiana-blue-lives-matter-law/index.html (describing passage 
of House Bill 953). 
 211. See, e.g., W. David Ball, Tough on Crime (on the State’s Dime): How 
Violent Crime Does Not Drive California Counties’ Incarceration Rates—And 
Why It Should, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 987, 1018–34 (2012) (analyzing data from 
2000–2009 and describing how county-level criminal justice officials, including 
prosecutors, vary greatly in their use of state incarceration as a response to 
crime); Erika Martin, While Some California DAs Are Throwing Out Old Pot 
Convictions, L.A. County’s Jackie Lacey Takes a Different Path, KTLA5 (Feb. 3, 
2018), https://ktla.com/2018/02/03/while-some-california-das-are-throwing-out 
-old-pot-convictions-angelenos-will-have-to-be-proactive-in-clearing-records 
(describing different policies among California district attorneys on expunge-
ment of marijuana offenses); cf. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, IN-
VESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT 10–15 (2015), https:// 
www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ 
ferguson_police_department_report.pdf (describing prosecution policies moti-
vated by revenue-generating goals). 
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prosecutors. The political variability of local prosecutors’ charg-
ing policies—and the vulnerability of those decisions to local sen-
timent that favors unjustified underenforcement—are a key rea-
son federal redundancy is important in this context. Given that 
police misconduct is an established part of the U.S. Justice De-
partment’s enforcement agenda, federal prosecutors should be a 
check on political judgments of local prosecutors. They also pro-
vide victims with a different agency to appeal to for investigation 
and prosecution. 
This federalism-based model of redundant enforcement has 
advantages as a strategy to reduce risks of unmerited underen-
forcement. The alternative model authorizing judicial review of 
declination decisions, as is used in England, relies on the inde-
pendence of judges from the prosecutors whom they review.212 
The federalism model relies on the independence of federal pros-
ecutors from state prosecutors and police. The executive branch 
of one sovereign scrutinizes the enforcement response of an-
other. And it has the capacity to act on its independent judg-
ment, while courts are confined to ordering prosecutors to re-
verse their earlier non-prosecution decisions (or, occasionally, to 
appointing substitute prosecutors). This “executive separation of 
powers” model has proven effective, although whether it is effec-
tive enough is debated; it depends on whether all cases of police 
violence that should have been prosecuted—based on the evi-
dence and the public interest in enforcement—were prosecuted. 
State and federal prosecution offices have distinct professional 
cultures and are responsive to different constituencies and 
modes of political supervision, which increases the independence 
of one from the other.213 On the other hand, federal prosecution 
is still to some degree political; it varies with the policy priorities 
of presidential administrations214 to a degree that judicial review 
 
 212. The alternative of administrative review within the Crown Prosecution 
Service relies on whatever independence is sustained by the bureaucratic hier-
archy, administrative regulations, and professional norms. See supra note 111 
and accompanying text. 
 213. U.S. Attorneys and the U.S. Attorney General are political appointees, 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (Appointments Clause); 28 U.S.C. § 541 (2012) (“The 
President shall appoint . . . a United States attorney for each judicial district.”), 
although much of the Justice Department staff are nonpolitical, civil service 
appointees. See Government Ethics Outline, U.S. DEP’T JUST., https://www 
.justice.gov/jmd/government-ethics-outline (last updated July 5, 2017) (explain-
ing ethics rules for “non-career” political appointees and for career employees). 
 214. See Sanford C. Gordon, Assessing Partisan Bias in Federal Public Cor-
ruption Prosecutions, 103 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 534, 549 (2009) (finding evidence 
of political party bias among federal prosecutors). 
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(in theory) should not. When there is less federal commitment to 
oversight of states’ approaches to police violence, enforcement 
redundancy is weak.215 Victims and other interested parties 
have no other recourse. 
C. UNDERENFORCEMENT AND PROSECUTOR POLITICAL 
ACCOUNTABILITY 
In short, U.S. strategies of enforcement redundancy have a 
relatively strong track record for some crimes such as public cor-
ruption, are robust but vulnerable to political shifts for others 
such as a police violence, and are notably weak with regard to 
certain offenses, such as sexual assaults. That last category is 
important because that weakness extends well beyond sexual as-
sault offenses; many of the routine crimes that make up typical 
state criminal dockets are not within the scope of federal crimi-
nal law enforcement. And since private prosecution and judicial 
or administrative review of prosecutorial decisions are almost 
completely absent from state criminal justice systems, there is 
no charging-decision oversight of state prosecutors’ declination 
decisions and enforcement policies—save for local electoral ac-
countability. In forty-five of fifty states, chief prosecutors are di-
rectly elected in local constituencies.216 This form of democratic 
accountability operates as a kind of check on underenforcement, 
although it has significant limits in its capacity to play that role. 
State prosecutors’ elected status is likely the best explana-
 
 215. The clearest historical example would be the post-Reconstruction dec-
ades, starting roughly after 1876, when the federal government retreated from 
civil rights enforcement in the former Confederate states, including from pros-
ecutions for criminal rights violations and offenses that states declined to 
charge, including for homicides. See generally ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: 
AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at 524–86 (2014) (describing 
declining enthusiasm for civil rights enforcement and waning Republican polit-
ical influence in the South); WILLIAM GILLETTE, RETREAT FROM RECONSTRUC-
TION, 1869–1879, at 190–200 (1979) (describing Southern Democrats efforts to 
resist civil rights enforcement); GEORGE RUTHERGLEN, CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE 
SHADOW OF SLAVERY: THE CONSTITUTION, COMMON LAW, AND THE CIVIL 
RIGHTS ACT OF 1866, at 95–100 (2013) (describing Supreme Court decisions lim-
iting the enforcement of the Civil Rights Act of 1866). 
 216. Alaska, Connecticut, and New Jersey do not elect prosecutors. PERRY, 
supra note 122, at 2. Delaware and Rhode Island elect state attorneys general, 
whose appointed staff handle all prosecutions. Id. at 11. Except in these juris-
dictions, state attorneys general and justice departments generally have little 
authority over local prosecutors’ offices. Cf. Michael J. Ellis, The Origins of the 
Elected Prosecutor, 121 YALE L.J. 1528, 1528 n.1 (2012) (noting that elected 
prosecutors are unique to the United States). 
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tion for why victim-based checks on declination—private prose-
cution or judicial review—never became a part of victims’ rights 
reforms enacted in U.S. jurisdictions in recent decades. First, 
prosecutors are politically powerful groups with legislatures, 
and they zealously guard their unfettered discretion over crimi-
nal charging.217 Second, it has led even courts to disfavor any 
degree of judicial review of charging decisions, on the rationale 
that oversight of prosecutors lies in the political process rather 
than judicial enforcement of legal parameters for charging.218 
Third, popular and political pressure has succeeded in redress-
ing some underenforcement practices by prosecutors (and police) 
when victim groups, or issues tied to specific offenses, achieve 
political potency. Intoxicated driving is perhaps the best exam-
ple of harmful wrongdoing about which many enforcement agen-
cies have successfully revised their policies to increase enforce-
ment.219 Domestic violence and sexual assaults are other 
examples where enforcement shifts have been more limited but 
still significant.220 
Responses by local agencies to this type of pressure have 
taken three basic forms. First, chief prosecutors adopted internal 
office policies that mandate—or set a strong presumption for—
 
 217. A classic account of prosecutors’ political influence is William J. Stuntz, 
The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505, 546–57 
(2001). For an insightful account of federal prosecutors successfully convincing 
Congress to expand their discretion at the expense of judges’ sentencing author-
ity, see United States v. Kupa, 976 F. Supp. 2d 417, 419–27 (E.D.N.Y. 2013) 
(describing the legislative history and Justice Department lobbying related to 
federal drug statutes, notably 21 U.S.C. § 841 (2012)). 
 218. See, e.g., Milliken v. Stone, 7 F.2d 397, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 1925), aff ’d 16 
F.2d 981 (2d Cir. 1927) (“The remedy for [dereliction of the prosecutor’s duty] is 
with the executive and ultimately with the people.”); In re Hickson, 2000 PA 
Super 402, ¶ 36 (“The prosecutor is elected to run her office using her broad 
discretion fairly and honestly. If she fails to do so, . . . the remedy lies in the 
power of the electorate to vote her out of office.”); In re Padget, 678 P.2d 870, 
873–74 (Wyo. 1984) (“[D]istrict and county attorneys hold elective offices; if 
their constituents are unsatisfied, they are free to express their feelings at the 
voting polls.”); cf. Cheney v. U.S. Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004) (“The 
decision to prosecute a criminal case . . . is made by a publicly accountable pros-
ecutor.”). For discussion of this point, see BROWN, supra note 126, at 33–41. 
 219. See Adam M. Gershowitz, 12 Unnecessary Men: The Case for Eliminat-
ing Jury Trials in Drunk Driving Cases, 2011 U. ILL. L. REV. 961, 966–69, 984–
87 (2011). 
 220. Emily J. Sack, Battered Women and the State: The Struggle for the Fu-
ture of Domestic Violence Policy, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1657, 1689–90 (2004). 
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prosecution of specific crimes when evidence is sufficient.221 Sec-
ond, prosecutors get specialized training on how to address the 
particular challenges posed by specific kinds of cases such as do-
mestic violence or sexual assault.222 Finally, many offices have 
established dedicated, in-house units of prosecutors who special-
ize in these same kinds of crimes.223 States legislatures have en-
couraged these reforms,224 but virtually everywhere, the adop-
tion, content, and enforcement of policies is left to local chief 
prosecutors. No legislation sets specific charging criteria, au-
thorized judicial review, or gives enforceable rights to victims.225 
These responses to underenforcement are meaningful, but 
their form is more political than legal. They are the kinds of re-
sponses produced by a system of electorally accountable prose-
cutors and legislatures.226 Often they are in large part attribut-
able to successful political efforts by advocacy groups. Mothers 
Against Drunk Driving (MADD), for example, successfully urged 
reforms of laws and enforcement practices against intoxicated 
driving.227 Feminist groups and women’s advocates play im-
portant, ongoing roles in reforming police and prosecution poli-
cies, substantive criminal laws, and evidence rules for domestic 
 
 221. Police departments also widely adopted mandatory arrest policies, es-
pecially for domestic violence offenses. For discussions and examples of both 
police and prosecution policies on domestic violence and sexual assault, see Aya 
Gruber, The Feminist War on Crime, 92 IOWA L. REV. 741, 760 & n.90 (2007); 
Sack, supra note 220. Note how this resembles the mandatory prosecution duty 
familiar in European systems, although it is an internal policy rather than stat-
utory mandate. See supra Part II.B.1. 
 222. See supra note 186 and accompanying text. 
 223. Id. 
 224. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 741.2901(1)–(2) (2018) (“Each state attorney shall 
develop special units or assign prosecutors to specialize in the prosecution of 
domestic violence cases . . . [who] shall receive training in domestic violence is-
sues. . . . The state attorney in each circuit shall adopt a pro-prosecution policy 
for acts of domestic violence . . . .”); WIS. STAT. § 968.075(7) (2018) (“Each dis-
trict attorney’s office shall develop, adopt and implement written policies en-
couraging the prosecution of domestic abuse offenses.”). 
 225. Some state legislatures enact voluntary charging criteria in statutes 
that affirm prosecutorial discretion. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 9.94A.411 
(2018) (“A prosecuting attorney may decline to prosecute, even though techni-
cally sufficient evidence to prosecute exists,” and providing a “Guideline/Com-
mentary” for such decisions). 
 226. See supra note 224 (citing state statutes in Florida and Wisconsin that 
encourage or mandate local prosecutors to adopt policies that improve enforce-
ment). 
 227. Gershowitz, supra note 219. 
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violence and sexual assault offenses.228 These efforts have suc-
ceeded in changing attitudes, professional cultures, and enforce-
ment practices in police and prosecution agencies that had con-
tributed to underenforcement in these areas.229 Prosecution 
units specializing in offenses such as domestic violence, for ex-
ample, strengthen professional culture committed to enforce-
ment by attracting lawyers who share that commitment and who 
develop expertise to act on it.230 
Successes notwithstanding, reliance on this kind of political 
supervision cannot be an equally effective remedy for underen-
forcement across all contexts. The independence of local prose-
cution and police agencies means that policies, resources, and 
constituent support for rigorous enforcement inevitably vary.231 
They will differ not only across localities but also according to 
the type of offense and the identity of the victim. Some groups, 
such as victims of intoxicated drivers, can succeed at achieving 
more rigorous enforcement policies.232 Other victims with less 
political support or popular sympathy—undocumented immi-
grants, sex workers, prison inmates, and casualties of police 
shootings233—have dimmer prospects when prosecutors are re-
sponsive to local majorities’ preferences. In some places, public 
 
 228. On domestic violence and rape offenses, see Gruber, supra note 221, at 
752–63 (recounting the feminist movement’s efforts to reform domestic violence 
and rape prosecution law and policies); id. at 760 & n.90 (citing statutes that 
require prosecutors to adopt “pro-prosecution” policies for domestic violence); id. 
at 763–74 (describing the history of victim rights’ movement); Sack, supra note 
220, at 1666, 1689–90 (2004) (describing the women’s movement as focused on 
domestic violence since the 1960s and arguing that mandatory prosecution pol-
icies are necessary for police and prosecutors to make the “right choices”); Chris-
tine O’Connor, Note, Domestic Violence No-Contact Orders and the Autonomy 
Rights of Victims, 40 B.C. L. REV. 937, 942–43 (1999) (arguing that prosecutors’ 
view of domestic violence as a private problem contributed to reluctance to pros-
ecute). On drunk-driving law and policy, see Gershowitz, supra note 219 (de-
scribing efforts by MADD and other groups to toughen laws and enforcement 
efforts against drunk driving and summarizing subsequent law reform). 
 229. See supra note 228. 
 230. Cf. Long & Wilkinson, supra note 186, at 1 (explaining that specialized 
prosecution units provide prosecutors with the opportunity to work with “com-
munity partners”). 
 231. See, e.g., Jeffrey Ulmer & Christopher Bader, Do Moral Communities 
Play a Role in Criminal Sentencing? Evidence from Pennsylvania, 49 SOC. Q. 
737, 753, 757 (2008) (finding in county-level data that “Christian religious ho-
mogeneity” increases the likelihood of incarceration, especially when Christian 
denominations are civically engaged, partially through the effect of local Repub-
lican Party dominance via the election of judges and prosecutors). 
 232. Gershowitz, supra note 219. 
 233. See generally Richard Pérez-Peña & Timothy Williams, Glare of Video 
Is Shifting Public’s View of Police, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 2015, at A1 (describing 
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sentiment is a force in favor of charging in categories of wrong-
doing that have suffered from patterns of underenforcement. In 
other places, the same can be a force against charging and can 
reinforce underenforcement practices. Either way, electoral ac-
countability can lead to undue pressure on prosecutors to yield 
to majoritarian or interest-group pressure to avoid “commit[ing] 
political suicide.”234 
In short, political supervision, as an institutional structure 
to minimize unjustified failures to prosecute, is an institutional 
structure with a highly uneven track record and decidedly mixed 
prospects. On the other hand, some of the strategies for enforce-
ment redundancy examined above that take the form of legal en-
titlements would likely also achieve partial success. Private 
prosecution is an unpromising device to aid certain marginalized 
victim groups such as inmates, undocumented immigrants, or 
low-income people generally. Other options—review of declina-
tion by courts, or concurrent jurisdiction of a separate prosecu-
tion agency—hold somewhat more promise. Judicial review is 
somewhat more removed from political influence (though per-
haps less so in jurisdictions that elect judges),235 although that 
mechanism still depends on victims to petition for review. The 
overlap of federal and state criminal jurisdiction subjects en-
forcement to review by a rival agency subject to, at worst, differ-
ent political influences. At best, as with a Justice Department 
that can minimize political influence with professional and bu-
reaucratic norms, it expands the prospect for less political re-
view.236 
 
survey data on public views about police and apparent effects of video evidence 
on public opinion); Santo, supra note 186 (describing enforcement challenges for 
crimes against prison inmates). 
 234. Ian Lovett, Los Angeles Joins Debate on Force After Police Killing of a 
Homeless Man, N.Y. TIMES, April 17, 2016, at A12 (describing the “pressure that 
prosecutors now face to move aggressively against officers who kill civilians” 
and quoting an activist who says that the Los Angeles prosecutor’s failure to 
indict in one case would be “political suicide”). 
 235. See Carlos Berdejó & Noam Yuchtman, Crime, Punishment, and Poli-
tics: An Analysis of Political Cycles in Criminal Sentencing, 95 REV. ECON. STAT. 
741, 754–55 (2013) (finding that elected judges in Washington state assign 
longer sentences in years closest to elections); Sanford C. Gordon & Gregory A. 
Huber, The Effect of Electoral Competitiveness on Incumbent Behavior, 2 Q.J. 
POL. SCI. 107, 133 (2007) (comparing partisan and nonpartisan judicial elections 
in Kansas and finding strong effects on sentencing when judges in partisan elec-
tions expect or face challengers). See generally, JED HANDELSMAN SHUGERMAN, 
THE PEOPLE’S COURTS (2012) (providing a history of elected judges). 
 236. For a knowledgeable account of the U.S. Justice Department’s tradi-
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  CONCLUSION   
 All justice systems suffer from pockets of unjustified, even 
pernicious, underenforcement. All recognize that public prosecu-
tors can be vulnerable to biases and institutional interests that 
distort enforcement decisions. Especially in recent decades, 
nearly all have adopted mechanisms to address those risks. Out-
side the United States, victim rights legislation has included 
provisions directed at unjustified decisions not to prosecute. In 
other common law countries and in Europe, most victims may 
now either seek independent review of prosecutors or initiate 
prosecutions on their own. Independent review keeps the safe-
guard against underenforcement in public hands while strength-
ening the principle that charging decisions should be nonpoliti-
cal and ministerial in nature. Victim rights reforms in general 
manifest a judgment that modern criminal justice had focused 
excessively on public interests and unduly neglected victims’ pri-
vate interests in criminal prosecutions. Authorizing victims to 
challenge declination decisions extends this idea by recognizing 
victims’ private stake in those decisions and enabling victims to 
serve the public interest in preventing unjustified failures to 
prosecute.237 
Virtually all U.S. jurisdictions reject both of those strate-
gies.238 And rather than insulate their prosecutors from political 
 
tions of professionalism that mostly minimize political influence in charging de-
cisions, see generally SAMUEL W. BUELL, CAPITAL OFFENSES: BUSINESS CRIME 
AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICA’S CORPORATE AGE (2016). But see Gordon, supra 
note 214; cf. Scott Ashworth, Electoral Accountability: Recent Theoretical and 
Empirical Work, 15 ANN. REV. POL. SCI. 183, 183–201 (2012) (surveying theo-
retical and empirical research into the connection between political accounta-
bility and policy decisions). 
 237. See, e.g., In re Hickson, 2000 PA Super 402, ¶ 41 (finding that private 
prosecutions “constitute[ ]  a recognition by the legislature that the office of the 
district attorney should be subject to a system of checks and balances”); In re 
Piscanio, 344 A.2d 658, 660–61 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1975) (“The judge’s independent 
review of the complaint checks and balances the district attorney’s decision and 
further hedges against possibility of error.”). 
 238. Outside the United States, prosecution agencies are commonly under a 
politically accountable justice minister or attorney general, whose political judg-
ment, in principle, operates only at the level of broad policy and should not in-
terfere with specific case decisions. See, e.g., Prosecution of Offences Act 1974, 
§ 2(5) (Act No. 22/1974) (Ir.) http://www.irishstatutebook.ie/eli/1974/act/22/ 
section/2/enacted/en/index.html (“The Director [of Public Prosecutions] shall be 
independent in the performance of his functions.”). Australia’s Office of the 
Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions, whose director is appointed for 
a seven-year term, is an independent prosecution service within the Common-
wealth Attorney-General’s portfolio, but functions independently of the Attor-
ney-General and the political process. Director of Public Prosecutions Act 1983 
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influence, most states rely on electoral politics for oversight of 
prosecution practices. Instead, the U.S. model opts for duplica-
tive federal-state jurisdiction against a background of politically 
attuned state prosecutors. Both this federalism model of redun-
dant prosecutorial authority—which may be reduced this term 
by the Supreme Court’s decision in Gamble—and the model of 
politically responsive prosecutors have proven effective at re-
dressing some types of underenforcement. Both serve some vic-
tims’ interests without taking the form of victim rights. And both 
reflect a preference for political over legal safeguards against bi-
ased or ill-conceived uses of prosecutorial discretion. 
American criminal justice is more sanguine than other legal 
systems about the downsides of prosecutors’ electoral accounta-
bility and attention to majoritarian sentiments. U.S. prosecu-
tors’ democratic legitimacy works against arguments for more 
formal oversight or regulation. Even against the potent political 
power of victims’ rights movements, unfettered executive charg-
ing discretion has proven immutable.239 But federal prosecutors 
provide significant oversight, at least for some important kinds 
of crimes within states’ jurisdictions. This federalism-based 
model of enforcement redundancy is a distinctive if not unique 
hybrid: it provides independent review removed from local elec-
toral politics, yet power remains in the hands of professional, ri-
val, and politically accountable executive branch officials. 
The insight of the U.S. approach is that, for many types of 
 
(Cth) (Austl.) (as amended 2012); About Us, COMMONWEALTH DIR. PUB. PROSE-
CUTIONS, http://www.cdpp.gov.au/AboutUs (last visited Oct. 30, 2018); see also 
MARK FINDLAY ET AL., AUSTRALIAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE 125–26 (1994) (describ-
ing “the development of prosecutorial independence from the executive”). Can-
ada’s Public Prosecution Service describes itself as “an independent prosecution 
authority.” See About the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, PUB. PROSECU-
TION SERV. CAN., http://www.ppsc-sppc.gc.ca/eng/bas/dpp-dpp.html (last up-
dated Apr. 4, 2018). The Canadian Supreme Court affirms the prosecutor’s wide 
discretion with reference to his political independence. See Krieger v. Law Soci-
ety of Alta., [2002] 3 S.C.R. 372, para. 32 (Can.) (“The independence of the At-
torney-General, in deciding fairly who should be prosecuted, is . . . a hallmark 
of a free society.” (quoting In re Hoem v. Law Soc’y of B.C. (1985), 63 B.C.L.R. 
36 (Can. B.C. C.A.))). 
 239. For a sample of longstanding criticisms of unregulated prosecutorial 
discretion, see DAVIS, supra note 123; ROSCOE POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN 
AMERICA 183 (1930) (criticizing the “intimate connection of the prosecutor’s of-
fice with politics.”); James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power, 
94 HARV. L. REV. 1521, 1554–60 (1981) (arguing that the scope of prosecutorial 
discretion is too broad). See generally RAYMOND MOLEY, POLITICS AND CRIMI-
NAL PROSECUTION (1929) (criticizing political influence over prosecution). 
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underenforcement, federal oversight combined with democrati-
cally responsive local prosecutors can perform the same function 
as judicial review and private prosecution of correcting bad dec-
lination decisions driven by institutional allegiances, cultural bi-
ases, and favoritism. Politically responsive criminal justice 
sometimes works relatively well at changing prosecution prac-
tices to serve victim interests that majorities or strong interest 
groups embrace. Politics has brought meaningful reforms to 
prosecution for drunk driving, for example, and it has led to im-
provements, if still insufficient ones, regarding domestic violence 
and sexual assault crimes. But political accountability has not 
worked as well to remedy underenforcement when key victim 
groups have less public sympathy, or key defendant groups, such 
as police, have a lot. Redundant prosecution authority, in the 
form of federal oversight, has a similarly mixed track record. 
Federal law has done much to compensate for state underen-
forcement of public corruption offenses. It has made significant 
but less ambitious and successful commitments in the context of 
police violence. And federal authorities so far have attempted to 
reinforce state sexual assault enforcement only at the margins. 
The track record of the U.S. responses to underenforcement, 
then, is mixed. But it is not clear that the alternative safeguards 
that predominate elsewhere are, on their own, clearly superior. 
Private prosecution is little use for victims with few financial re-
sources or who are legally unsophisticated. Judicial review of 
declination can be exceedingly deferential, especially if statutes 
and regulations do not provide courts with clear criteria against 
which to assess prosecutorial decision making. Jurisdictions 
strongly committed to reducing unjustified declinations would 
combine most or all of these mechanisms. U.S. jurisdictions ar-
guably have a history that should have made them especially 
likely to do so. States once permitted and relied on private pros-
ecutions; judicial authority to review executive action, outside of 
prosecutor charging, is at least as robust here as in England; the 
movement for crime victim rights was as effective here as any-
where. The failure to devise more comprehensive safeguards 
suggests that certain specific pockets of underenforcement—in-
volving police, marginalized victim groups, and sexual as-
saults—are especially hard to remedy, regardless of readily 
available solutions. 
